The Feminist Negotiator's Dilemma by Del Gobbo, Daniel
The Feminist Negotiator's Dilemma
DANIEL DEL GOBBO*
I. INTRODUCTION: NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO GENDER IN PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION
A. The "Sex/Gender" Framework
B. Sex/Gender Diference in Principled Negotiation
C. Traditional Approaches to Sex/Gender in Principled
Negotiation
1. LIBERAL FEMINIST NEGOTIATION
2. CULTURAL FEMINIST NEGOTIATION
D. Moving Beyond the Traditional Approaches
Ill. A POSTMODERN FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF GENDER IN PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION
A. Anti-Identitarian Theories and Applications
B. Protean Negotiation
C. An Identity-Equivocal Politics
IV. CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATING RESISTANCE
Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholar, CBA
Viscount Bennett Fellow, SSHRC Doctoral Fellow, S.J.D. Candidate (Toronto); LL.M.
(Harvard); J.D. (Osgoode), Hons. B.A. (Queen's), of the Bar of Ontario. This article
benefited from comments received at the Harvard Law School Graduate Program
conference in May 2015 and Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture, and the Humanities at Stanford Law School in March 2017. 1 am indebted to
Blaine Baker, Jane Fair Bestor, Brenda Cossman, Afroditi Giovanopoulou, Janet Halley,
Sarah Kaplan, Catharine MacKinnon, Max Rosen, Simon Stem, Yotam Zeira, and Fred
Zemans for their friendship and mentorship at various stages of my writing.
1
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ABSTRACT
This article challenges traditional approaches to gender difference in
prescriptive negotiation analysis. Historically, dispute resolution scholars and
practitioners analyzing the determinants of gender have either assumed or
concluded that women and men negotiate differently, with so-called
"women's ways" being seen as less effective than "men's ways" at achieving
principled negotiation results. This position has led scholars to offer
prescriptive negotiation advice that maps onto two forms of difference
feminism: liberal feminist negotiation (translatable as "fix the woman") and
cultural feminist negotiation (translatable as "fix the system around the
woman"). This article critiques difference feminist theory for its practical
and political implications in principled negotiation. These criticisms suggest
that difference feminist theory limits the range of negotiation tools accessible
to everyone by reinscribing sex and gender stereotypes, and only allows
room for feminist interventions based in minoritizing discourses of
female/feminine bargaining identity at the expense of universalizing
discourses of human activity. The article then offers an alternative based in
postmodem feminism, "protean negotiation," that aspires to dissolve fixed
gender identities for the practical and political benefit of both women and
men. This article concludes by suggesting that a form of the classic
Negotiator's Dilemma is reflected in the progressive politics of gender in
negotiation where cultural feminism and postmodern feminism suggest a
tension between ideological commitments to "identity" and "activity"
respectively. These intuitions give rise to a struggle called the "Feminist
Negotiator's Dilemma," and there may be no way to resolve it. The task for
progressive politics should be to accept these competing imperatives and to
negotiate their contradictions if feminists are to effectively understand, let
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1. INTRODUCTION: NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE
Negotiation was historically perceived to be a mercenary activity: each
party takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a
compromise that maximizes the party's share of resources.' This perception
has been mitigated by the growing acceptance and institutionalization of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") based on Roger Fisher, William Ury,
and Bruce Patton's ground-breaking manual, Getting to YES: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In,2 which proposes the "principled negotiation"
model as an integrative alternative3 to the more adversarial, distributive
' Historically, the legal literature on negotiation described the bargaining process as
a linear sequence of offers and counteroffers punctuated by concessions, bluffs, threats,
and other tactical behaviors, leading to a negotiated agreement somewhere between the
parties' original positions. This characterization is based in liberal economic theory,
which suggests that the involved parties are rational, self-maximizing actors who share
the same goals or values and bargain for the same "scarce" resources with a view to
reaching a settlement predicated upon dividing those resources. However, the
fundamental goal is maximizing victory- that is, increasing the likelihood that a
lawyer's client will prevail and maximizing the amount that client receives upon
prevailing. See generally MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973);
OTOMAR J. BARTOS, PROCESS AND OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS, 3-4 (1974); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669,
675-77 (1978); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model ofStrategic Behavior, II J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (1982).
2 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011). Over the past three decades, there has
been a surge of academic and popular interest in consensual dispute resolution as a
theoretical and practical alternative to adversarial methods. In addition to Getting to YES,
a number of other accessible works on legal negotiation, while less well-known, have
similarly focused on collaborative problem-solving. See, e.g., RICHARD SHELL,
BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (2d
ed. 2006).
Integrative bargaining is a strategy in which parties seek to create entitlements
beyond any fixed or tangible amount of resources, by "creating" other forms of value and
"expanding the pie." Distributive bargaining is a strategy in which the parties negotiate to
distribute among themselves a fixed amount of resources, usually money, chattels, real
property, or other tangibles, by "claiming" entitlements and "dividing the pie." See
generally FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 2; Dean G. Pruitt & Steven A. Lewis, The
Psychology of Integrative Bargaining, in NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Daniel Druckman ed.,1977); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 116 (1987); Colleen M. Hanycz,
Introduction to the Negotiation Process Model, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATION (Colleen M. Hanycz et al., eds., 2008).
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bargaining strategy.' "Principled negotiation" emphasizes four precepts:
"separate the people over the problem"; "focus on interests, not positions";
"generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do"; and "insist
that the result be based on some objective standard."' This model is more
conducive to solving problems where the parties' interests are shared, the
issues in dispute are contingent or multi-dimensional, and the relationship
between the parties is ongoing and worth preserving.' As a normative
prescription of what "good" negotiation looks like, principled negotiation has
generated a rich academic scholarship exploring its theoretical and practical
applications in a variety of settings.
One of the most contentious topics in this area is the relationship
between gender and principled negotiation behavior, particularly in the law
and business settings.' The state of the research is murky. Some studies show
that men and women are equally adept at applying principled negotiation
skills, while other studies suggest that women may be less adept for a host of
social, cultural, economic, legal, and psychological reasons.' While this
4 I describe the distributive bargaining model as "adversarial" to evoke the
prevailing common law practice of courtroom litigation. Because legal negotiations are
often conducted in the shadow of the courts, they are generally assumed to be zero-sum
games with only two possible, mutually-exclusive outcomes for each party at trial -
victory or defeat. More to the point, the increasing and exorbitant delays, costs, biases,
and other access to justice issues associated with the adversarial trial process continue to
contribute to the impetus of legal negotiation as a necessary alternative. See generally
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter, Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View].
5 See FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 2, at 10-11.
6 It is foolhardy to attempt a typology of legal disputes that are amenable to either a
distributive or integrative bargaining strategy in all cases because there will always be
exceptions. Perhaps the least controversial principle is that in a situation where there are
only two parties at the table, neither has a desire for an ongoing relationship, and the only
issue to be decided is money, the negotiation may be safely considered a competitive
zero-sum game. In a situation where the parties' joint gains or ongoing relationship are a
priority, the negotiation may need to take on a more integrative form with recourse to
behaviors like listening, respectful inquiry, information exchange, and creative
brainstorming instead of or in addition to competitive tactics. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33-43 (1982); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 785-
86, n. 120-121.
' Scholars have theorized, interrogated, and tested the impact of gender on
negotiation since the earliest days of ADR research. For the first dedicated analysis of the
issue, see JEFFREY Z. RuBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
BARGAINING (1975).
8 The relevant legal, business, economic, and psychological literature on the relation
of gender to principled negotiation is vast. There have been many comprehensive studies.
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question remains controversial, there is broad consensus among feminist
negotiation scholars that a person's gender has a differential impact on her
negotiation style, insofar as gender norms in society may inform or be
informed by specific bargaining behaviors.' I find it variously problematic
that so much of the research in this area presumes gender difference to be a
fixed, independent, and necessary determinant of principled negotiation
skills, which is a fundamental error that has significant implications for the
mission of gender equality."o In my view, this field has been critically
undertheorized, as there are postmodern feminist and queer theories of
gender established elsewhere in the law that should invite feminists to
critique the role of gender difference in principled negotiation." This article
is my attempt at one such critical intervention.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of
a Theory, 4 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 905 (1983); Carol Watson, Gender Differences in
Negotiating Behavior and Outcomes: Fact or Artifact, in CONFLICT AND GENDER (Anita
Taylor & Judi Beinstein Miller eds., 1994); Amy E. Walters et al., Gender and
Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-Analysis, 76 ORG. BEH. AND HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 1 (1998); Alice Stuhlmacher & Amy Walters, Gender Differences in
Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653 (1999); Charles B.
Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 299 (1999); Laura J. Kray & Leigh Thompson, Gender Stereotypes and
Negotiation Performance: An Examination of the Theory and Research, 26 ORG. BEHAV.
SER. 103 (2005); Alice Stuhlmacher & R. B. Winkler, Negotiating While Female:
Research and Implications, in GENDER AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES AT WORK (M.
Barrett & M. J. Davidson eds., 2006); Hannah Riley Bowles & Kathleen L. McGinn,
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game, 24 NEGOT. J. 393 (2008); Andreas
Feidakis & Aspasia Tsaoussi, Competitiveness, Gender, and Ethics in Legal
Negotiations: Some Empirical Evidence, 14 INTL. NEGOT. 537 (2009); Deborah M. Kolb,
Too Bad for the Women or Does It Have to Be? Gender and Negotiation Research over
the Past Twenty-Five Years, 25 NEGOT. J. 515 (2009) [hereinafter Kolb, Too Bad for the
Women]; CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 269-
277 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION]; Deborah M.
Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows of Organizations: Gender, Negotiation, and Change,
28 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 241 (2013) [hereinafter Kolb, Negotiating in the
Shadows]; Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Gender on Negotiation Performance, 14
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 339 (2013) [hereinafter Craver, The Impact of Gender].
9 Infra notes 28-3 1.
10 I am not the first to challenge the presumption of gender difference that underpins
these studies. See Amy Cohen, Gender: An (Un) Useful Category of Prescriptive
Negotiation Analysis, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 169 (2003-2004) [hereinafter Cohen, An
(Un) Useful Category].
" While postmodern feminist theory and queer theory of gender are diverse fields,
there are certain works that may be considered canonical and assisted me in developing
this critique. See Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of
Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975); PLEASURE
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To contextualize my argument, I outline the traditional feminist
approaches to gender and principled negotiation in Section II of this article. I
explain that in the wake of empirical findings that so-called "women's ways"
of negotiating may be less effective than "men's ways,"1 2 scholars have
offered prescriptive negotiation advice that roughly maps onto two forms of
difference feminism: liberal feminist negotiation (interpreted here to mean
"fix the woman") and cultural feminist negotiation (interpreted here to mean
"fix the system around the woman").3 Because these approaches are
founded on firm, ideological conceptions of gender difference, they reflect
and reinscribe potentially harmful sex-based stereotypes about negotiation
behavior. And because these approaches locate gender identity as the
necessary site of feminist organizing, they provide negotiators with a limited
range of conceptual tools for their practical gain and political mobilization.
AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984); Leo Bersani,
Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM (Douglas
Crimp ed., 1988); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1., AN
INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1988) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY]; EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990)
[hereinafter SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET]; JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE]; Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT:
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) [hereinafter Butler, Imitation
and Gender]; Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992); EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, TENDENCIES (1993)
[hereinafter SEDGWICK, TENDENCIES]; JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993)
[hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER]; MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (1993); SEYLA BENHABIB, JUDITH
BUTLER, DRUCILLA CORNELL, & NANCY FRASER, FEMINIST CONTENTIONS: A
PHILOSOPHCAL EXCHANGE (1995); FEMINIST CONSEQUENCES: THEORY FOR THE NEW
CENTURY (Elizabeth Bronfen & Misha Kayka eds., 2000); Maxine Eichner, On
Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARv. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2001). Postmodem
feminist theory and queer theory have also found illuminating applications in many areas
of law. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS].
12 A few scholars have suggested to the contrary - that, if there was ever a question
about how women could achieve equal success in the male-dominated legal profession,
that question is no longer relevant in light of women's gains by admission to law schools
and law firms or changing models of negotiation practice. See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG &
DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 187 (2d ed.
2011). These scholars remain in the minority.
13 adopt the well-known labels "liberal feminism" and "cultural feminism" to
capture the general contours of the theoretical terrain in this area, with the knowledge
that scholars may apply these terms too readily to simplify or dismiss the more nuanced
ideas of others with whom they disagree. This is not my intention.
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I elaborate my critique in Section III of the article. Drawing primarily on
the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault, I
suggest that we should "trouble" the assumption underpinning the traditional
feminist approaches that gender identities are not socially defimed or capable
of subversion. This is plainly inconsistent with views that see gender as a
performative practice, which is animated by intersecting systems of cultural
regulation on the individual, interactional, and institutional levels.'4 By
eliding these dimensions, I argue that the traditional approaches fail to
recognize the wide, complex, and often contradictory range of behaviors that
can arise in women and men, including how these behaviors can be
harnessed by feminist negotiators for their practical and political benefit.
This leads me to conclude that if feminist negotiators learned to adapt our
abilities beyond the limits of fixed gender identity," we would gain access to
more diverse and enabling strategies to increase our tactical leverage and
suggest new, potentially liberating ways to address gender inequality in our
society.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO GENDER IN PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION
A. The "Sex/Gender" Framework
Following the publication of Getting to YES, there has been an enormous
amount of literature published on the theory, practice, and pedagogy of
principled negotiation. Its model is summarized with four key precepts.16 The
first precept, "separate the people from the problem," is that negotiators
should regard and make efforts to foster their personal relationships
separately from any substantive concessions needed to resolve the dispute.
Its second precept, "focus on interests, not positions," is that negotiators
14 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 37-48 ("[G]ender proves
to be performative - that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense,
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist
the deed ... There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is
performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its results.");
Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 21. For another application of
Butler's theory in the negotiation context, see Cohen, An (Un)Useful Category, supra
note 10, at 189-91.
" Peter Adler, Protean Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: A
DESKBOOK FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006).1
6 See FISHER, URY, & PATTON, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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should emphasize "interests," defined as the underlying needs or desires that
initially brought one or both parties to the table (say, a party's interest in
providing for her family), before one or both of their stated "positions" on
specific issues or outcomes is to be decided (say, the party's position that she
be paid $100,000 in annual salary). Its third precept, "generate a variety of
options before deciding what to do," is that negotiators should invent
multiple possible options for mutual gain ("enlarging the pie"), putting them
all on the before taking a position ("dividing the pie"). Its fourth precept,
"insist that the result be based on some objective standard," is that
negotiators should conduct an externally legitimate appraisal of a negotiated
outcome rather than allow it to be determined by the sole exercise of
subjective wills and power. Fisher, Ury, and Patton explain that "[t]hese four
points define a straightforward method of negotiation that can be used under
almost any circumstance."7 Indeed, principled negotiation has become
paradigmatic in legal and business studies as a model of effective bargaining
practice and pedagogy.
Since researchers theorized these foundations, there has been a flood of
interest in the possible relationship between individual background
characteristics and principled negotiation behaviors.'s To my knowledge, no
characteristic has been interrogated and tested in this context more than
gender.'9 This is partly explained by the historical coincidence of the rise of
ADR within the legal and business professions20 and the rise of the women's
movement, having as its focus the incidents of sex inequality in society and
the social and cultural dynamics in law and business that produce them. The
ongoing revelation of the differential treatment of women at work and
persistent gender gap in wages and promotional opportunities continues to
7 Id
18 RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 7. Gender has been studied in negotiation theory and
practice by academics in diverse fields including law, economics, business, game theory,
psychology, communications, anthropology, sociology, political studies, and
international relations. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About Gender and
Negotiation: Sex, Truths, and Videotape, 16 NEGOT. J. 357, 360 (2000) [hereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About Gender].
" Theoretical and empirical studies claiming to observe the incidents of
sexed/gendered negotiation behaviors are numerous, spawning several useful summaries
and meta-analyses. See RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 7, at 169; supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
20 The judicial promotion and mandate of settlement as a means of increasing access
to justice and administrative efficiency, together with the concomitant growth of ADR as
a distinct field of study, has been noted by various scholars. See, e.g., Marc Galanter &
Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342-43 (1994).
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inspire academic and popular interest in finding the right fix.21 While many
disagree on the role of negotiation in contributing to the problem or the
solution, gender is seen as an organizing principle of professional ife and an
important category of prescriptive negotiation analysis.
Another reason for this flood of interest is the apparent ease with which a
negotiator's gender can be attributed to male and female birth sex assigned
bodies, so long as researchers improperly aggregate their conceptions of sex
and gender.22 As most feminist and queer theorists understand it, "sex" refers
to anatomical and physiological attributes identified and assigned at birth
that distinguish men from women. "Gender" refers to clusters of social and
cultural traits overlaid on these distinctions that are typically associated with
an oppositional "masculinity" and "femininity," ranging from physical
appearance and self-presentation to personality, attitude, tone of voice,
speech patterns, body language, affectation, and behavior.23 This grounds my
necessary disclaimer that much of the work I characterize in this article as
taking one of the traditional feminist approaches to "gender" in principled
negotiation theory and practice, which term is predominant in the literature,
is really about sex.24 The control groups in these studies are often comprised
21 Deborah Kolb attributes recent interest in the role of gender in negotiation to
increased attention paid to sex inequality in employment. Women are still nowhere near
parity among the partner ranks or senior management of law firms, nor do they appear to
be progressing fast enough. See Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows, supra.note 8, at 241-
42.
22 Researchers have explicitly based their methodology on the perception that
"gender" is one of the most readily observable indicators of social and cultural
differentiation among negotiators. See, e.g., RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 7, at 169;
CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS 457 (2d ed. 2005); Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L.
Putnam, Gender is More than Who We Are, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: A
DESKBOOK FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 315 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006)
23 Gayle Rubin charts these definitions as comprising the feminist sex/gender
system. See generally Rubin, supra note 11, at 157-210. See also SEDGWICK,
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, supra note 11, at 27-28. Toril Moi offers an equally
concise schematic: "female" as a "matter of biology", "feminine" as a "set of culturally
defined characteristics", and "feminist" as a "political position." Toril Moi, Feminist,
Female, Feminine, in THE FEMINIST READER: ESSAYS IN GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF
LITERARY CRITICISM 117 (Catherine Belsey & Jane Moore eds., 1989).
24 See Kolb, Too Bad for the Women, supra note 8, at 517 (explaining that the terms
"sex" and "gender" tend to be used interchangeably in the negotiation field). This
conflation of sex and gender is not unique to the legal literature on negotiation, and it is
not always unintentional or necessarily the mark of a problematic politics. Consider, for
example, Catharine MacKinnon's theory that supports protecting female workers who
have given up ideal employment conditions because of child-care responsibilities by
9
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of men and women in which birth sex assignments and gendered traits and
tendencies are conflated ("sex/gender"), which sex and gender characteristics
may or may not be congruent in reality.2 5 This slippage can be traced through
the studies' methodology. Often, these studies assume that specific
bargaining behaviors are gender-coded masculine or feminine. These
assumptions then form the basis of hypotheses about the behaviors of birth-
assigned male and female subjects. These behaviors are then tested,
observed, and described in gendered and not sexual terms. Consequently, any
observed gender differences between the subjects are attributed to other
birth-assigned men or women.26 This imprecision lays the groundwork for
certain feminist theories of negotiation that vastly underestimate the range of
gender-related determinants of behavior, which in turn leads to prescriptive
negotiation advice that is largely applicable to mythological, sex/gender
congruent, "male/masculine" men and "female/feminine" women only. One
of my intentions in this article is to challenge this framework.
B. Sex Gender Diference in Principled Negotiation
Given its historical methodology, the animating theme in most legal,
economic, and psychological work on gender in principled negotiation is
male/masculine and female/feminine difference ("M" and "F" or "M/F").27
offering protections to women; this asks that disadvantages produced by gender are
remedied by reference to sex. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN - A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 122-24 (1979). Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick goes further, arguing that a conceptual confusion underpins the very ideas of
sex and gender. See SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, supra note 11, at 29
(arguing that feminist deployments of Rubin's "sex/gender" system can only use
"sex/gender" to delineate a problematic space rather than a crisp distinction).
2s Indeed, if we define "gender" as social and cultural traits traditionally associated
with masculinity and femininity, often subjectively perceived and overlaid onto birth sex-
assigned bodies, it is more challenging to devise a scientific methodology that identifies,
isolates, and measures gender effects, and not conflated sex/gender effects, in a
controlled experiment involving male and female birth sex-assigned bodies.
26 For a similar deconstruction of methodology, see Cohen, An (Un) Useful Category,
supra note 10, at 177, 182. It is important to note, of course, that not all studies in the
negotiation field fail to disaggregate sex and gender. See, e.g., Leonard Greenhalgh &
Roderick W. Gilkey, Our Game, Your Rules: Developing Effective Negotiating
Approaches, in NOT AS FAR AS You THINK: THE REALITIES OF WORKING WOMEN 135,
137-42 (1986).
27 Here and throughout, I apply and expand upon Janet Halley's shorthand for what
she describes as the constitutive minima of North American feminisms: M/F, M > F, and
carrying a brief for F. See HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 4-5.
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That is, men negotiate differently than women,2 negotiating with someone
of the same sex is different than negotiating with someone of the opposite
sex,29 men and women experience negotiations differently in cases where
gender is salient to the context of the dispute,30 and contextual variables may
aggravate or alleviate the differential impact that gender makes.3' These
insights follow a wave of interdisciplinary research that continues to test
hypotheses about gender difference in cognitive processing,3 2 child
development,3 3 socio-linguistics,34 and other social sciences under the wider
umbrella of negotiation studies. To organize the extensive findings on this
issue, I have adapted a framework created by Deborah Kolb that suggests
there are three predominant scholarly perspectives on the role of gender
difference in negotiation-what I have called the "individual," the
28 See infa "Negotiation Traits and Tendencies by Sex/Gender."
29 See generally Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race
and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304
(1995); Karin Hederos Eriksson et al., Gender Differences in Initiation of Negotiation:
Does the Gender of the Negotiation Counterpart Matter? 28 NEGOT. J. 407 (2012).
30 There may be no comprehensive account of legal contexts where gender will be
salient to a dispute, but it seems more likely to inhere in cases involving marriage and
divorce, custody and access, discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or
gender identity, sexual harassment, sexually-based criminal offences, medical, physical,
and emotional harms, immigration and refugee law, and social benefits claims. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution: Parties, Lawyers, and Dispute
Resolvers - What Difference Does Gender Difference Make, 18 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 6-
8 (2011-2012) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution].
3 See, e.g., Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation
and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 942, 946 (2001)
(suggesting that priming women negotiators with information that their gender is a
diagnostic of ability negatively affected their performance).
32 See, e.g., DOREEN KIMURA, SEX AND COGNITION (1999); LINDA MEALY, SEX
DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES (2000); STEVEN E.
RHOADS, TAKING SEX DIFFERENCES SERIOUSLY (2004).
33 See, e.g., Amy Sheldon, Pickle Fights: Gendered Talk in Preschool Disputes, in
GENDER AND CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993).
34 See., e.g., DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN
IN CONVERSATION (1990); NICOLE SCHAPIRO, NEGOTIATING FOR YOUR LIFE: NEW
SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR WOMEN (1993). Carol Gilligan writes that her own research,
infra notes 106-111, "suggests that men and women may speak different languages that
they assume are the same, using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self
and social relationships. Because these languages share an overlapping moral vocabulary,
they contain a propensity for systematic mistranslation, creating misunderstandings
which impede communication and limit the potential for cooperation and care in
relationships." CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 173 (1982).
11
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"interactional," and the "institutional" perspectives-each reflecting distinct
ideologies about the production of gendered behaviors.3 5
The first category of scholarship regards gender to be an "individual"
characteristic that is primarily generated within the character of the focal
negotiator herself, instead of the intragroup or situational context in which
the negotiation takes place. This perspective has disparate origins and
without providing a complete genealogy here, it should be contextualized
within the broader essentialism-constructionism debate about the incidence
of gender.36 The prevailing view is no longer that gender differences in
negotiation are individually determined as a matter of biology, meaning
irreducible and constitutive of the sexes because men are born
male/masculine and women are born female/feminine.37 Rather, this view
understands gender to be constructed through an ongoing process of
historical integration.38 Often drawing on research that boys and girls are
acculturated to gender-oppositional ethics and orientations from a very
young age, the central idea is that a male or female focal negotiator has been
socialized to adopt characteristics that are coded masculine or feminine by
society," which are manifest in observable negotiation traits and tendencies
3 See Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows, supra note 8, at 242-51; Kolb & Putnam,
supra note 22, at 317-19. Kolb's interpretive categories are not watertight because
negotiation researchers may share certain commitments that underpin one or more of
them. With that said, Kolb's categories remain a useful heuristic aid.
3 See generally Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994).
" As I go on to explain, arguments from biological determinism may be unappealing
in the practice-oriented negotiation field, but evolutionary psychologists and
neuropsychologists continue to propose theories from biology explaining why men and
women exhibit certain behaviors. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX,
EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); ANNE CAMPBELL, A MIND OF HER OwN: THE
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2002); LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE
BRAIN (2006). For a summary of findings suggesting that genetic or hormonal
differences between the sexes could cause women to be less competitive than men, see
Rachel Croson & Ury Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON LIT. 1, 20
(2009).
3 See generally Halley, Sexual Orientation, supra note 36, at 550-553.
* See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 34, at 10; Sandra Lipsitz Bem, Gender
Schema Theory and Its Implications for Child Development: Raising Gender-aschematic
Children in a Gender Schematic Society, 8(4) SIGNS 598 (1983); SANDRA LIPSITz BEM,
THE LENSES OF GENDER 125-127, 138-175 (1993); NICKY MARONE, WOMEN AND RISK:
How To MASTER YOUR FEARS AND DO WHAT You NEVER THOUGHT YOU COULD Do 42-
45 (1992); PAT HEIM & SUSAN K. GOLANT, HARDBALL FOR WOMEN: WINNING AT THE
GAME OF BUSINESS (rev. ed. 2005); GAIL EVANS, PLAY LIKE A MAN, WIN LIKE A
WOMAN: WHAT MEN KNow ABOUT SUCCESS THAT WOMEN NEED TO LEARN 12-13
12
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that are similarly coded masculine or feminine in the academic and
professional literature.40
The second category of scholarship examines the role of "interactional"
factors in constructing negotiation behaviors, including inter-group dynamics
that permit or prohibit certain gendered performances in a variety of legal
and business contexts. In this model, gender is not produced inside
individuals but between them through language and practice, forming and
reforming negotiation traits and tendencies that may be plotted along the
lines of sex/gender difference. Often, this conceives of gender as depending
on social and cultural "triggers" arising in the bargaining exchange on the
theory that relations between two men, two women, one man and one
woman, or some other configuration, can create observable effects in specific
situations.4' Some of the most instructive research in this area explores the
role of bias, stereotyping, and discrimination about sex/gender difference in
negotiation that give rise to negative perceptions about one's proclivity to
negotiate or one's preferred approach-a phenomenon that social
psychologist Claude Steele calls "stereotype threat." These perceptions can
prime knowledge structures in the mind that assimilate behaviors consistent
with the activated bias, stereotype, or discrimination, creating self-fulfilling
prophecies that work to the negotiator's disadvantage.42
(2000); BETTY LEHAN HARRAGAN, GAMEs YOUR MOTHER NEVER TAUGHT YOU:
CORPORATE GAMESMENSHIP FOR WOMEN 75-78, 282 (1977). For specific applications of
socialization theory in the negotiation context, see Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About
Gender, supra note 18, at 362-64; Greenhalgh & Gilkey, supra note 26, at 135; LINDA
BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER
DIVIDE 30-31, 34-35 (2003); but see Deborah M. Kolb, More Than Just a Footnote:
Constructing a Theoretical Framework for Teaching about Gender in Negotiation, 16
NEGOT. J. 347, 350 (2000) [hereinafter, Kolb, More Than Just a Footnote], citing
Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & Soc'Y 125 (1987)
(deemphasizing psychological socialization as the basis for gender difference) and Kolb,
Too Bad for the Women, supra note 8, at 526-527 (suggesting that we work to "undo"
gender construction by focusing on negotiated orders).
40 For an excellent review of negotiation studies reflecting the "individual" or "focal
negotiator" perspective, see Kray & Thompson, supra note 8.
41 See Kray, supra note 31, at 942; Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution,
supra note 30, at 6; Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints and Triggers: Situational
Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 951-53
(2005); Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Women at the Bargaining Table: Pitfalls and
Prospects, 25 NEGOT. J. 233, 234 (2009).
42 See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape the Intellectual
Identities and Performance of Women and African Americans, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
613, 614 (1997); Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and
Over-Confident Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11
13
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The third category of scholarship looks to relational dynamics as well,
but with a focus on the "institutional" conditions in which gender may
influence negotiation behavior, usually by enabling or disabling access to
power. The idea is that emphasizing individual or interpersonal dynamics
alone may fail to capture the broader situational forces impressing on a
bargaining exchange. One strand of this research interrogates the correlation
between gendered performances and the nature of negotiation games as
distributive and adversarial (read: masculine) or integrative and collaborative
(read: feminine)." Another strand analyzes the ways in which masculine and
feminine orientations toward negotiation are triggered by disputes
themselves, often in marriage and divorce, sexual harassment, and
discrimination contexts where the subject matter may be socially or
culturally linked to gender." Yet another strand explores the differential
impact of gender hierarchical structures within organizations and cultures,
including the law and business professions, on male and female negotiators
that are affected by them.45 For instance, in Ann Hopkins's sex
discrimination case against a major accounting firm, gendered masculine
women may be seen as pushy and requiring "a course in charm school,"
while gendered feminine women may be seen as push-overs and requiring an
"assertiveness training class."4 6 This research explores the social and cultural
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 271, 274 (1999); Kray, supra note 31, at 943-955; Laura J. Kray
et al., Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiations: An Exploration of Stereotype
Regeneration, 87 ORG. BEH. & HUMAN DEC. PROC. 386, 388-390 (2002); Laura J. Kray
et al., Stereotype Reactance at the Bargaining Table: The Effect of Stereotype Activation
and Power on Claiming and Creating Value, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
399, 400-401, 404 (2004); Laura J. Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A
Motivated Social Cognitive Analysis, in NEGOTIATIONS THEORY AND RESEARCH:
FRONTIERS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 203, 219 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006); JOAN C.
WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMITLY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 149
(2010); CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 8, at 276.
4 See, e.g., Kray, supra note 8, at 114-127; Bowles et al., supra note 41, at 956.
" Supra note 30 and accompanying text. For an illustration in the context of
marriage and divorce, see Barbara C. Bedont, Gender Diferences in Negotiations and
the Doctrine of Unconscionability in Domestic Contracts, 12 CANADIAN FAM. L. J. Q. 21
(1994).
4 See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (2001),
available at http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/pdf/aba.unfinished.agenda.pdf; Amanda J.
Albert, The Use of MacKinnon's Dominance Feminism to Evaluate and Effectuate the
Advancement of Women Lawyers as Leaders within Large Law Firms, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 291 (2006).
' Ann Hopkins was an accountant whose candidacy for partnership at a male-
dominated, international accounting firm was denied on the basis of sex-based
14
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costs of female negotiators' "double bind" in which they need to be,
simultaneously, as masculine as professional standards require but as
feminine as sex/gender stereotypes require.47
By exposing these and other ways that gender is mobilized, the three
predominant perspectives imply that negotiation traits and tendencies are
flexible, free, and amenable to change-within certain limits.48 Alternative
conclusions are unappealing in a field oriented toward pragmatism, having as
its mission the instrumentalist, practice-based desiderata of learning when,
where, and why men and women negotiate differently and how they can
manage these differences, improve their skills, and gain strategic advantage
over their peers. Further to this goal, many researchers have claimed to
identify certain "reliable truths"4 9 about sex/gender differences in bargaining
stereotypes including, among others, that she should take "a course in charm school" and
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styles, and wear jewelry." She was the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), where the U.S. Supreme Court found that stereotypes
used as standards for professional advancement are a form of impermissible sex
discrimination under Title VII. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence,
105 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1995) ("Ann Hopkins, I fear, may have been protected only because
of the doubleness of her bind: It was nearly impossible for her to be both as masculine as
the job required and as feminine as gender stereotypes require.").
47 See Mary Power, Does a Woman Negotiator Have to be Like a Man? 5 AusTL. J.
DIsP. RESOL. 49, 50 (1994); Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions
to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416
(2004); Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Diferences in the
Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes it Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV.
AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 89-91 (2007); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah
Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce
Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 115-117 (2008); LINDA BABCOCK & SARA
LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT: How WOMEN CAN USE THE POWER OF NEGOTIATION TO GET
WHAT THEY REALLY WANT 256-258 (2008); Tinsley et al., supra note 41, at 236-237;
Kolb, Too Bad for the Women, supra note 8, at 522, 525. See also ABA COMMISSION ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1988), reprinted in
Naomi Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1039, 1048 (1992). But see Kolb,
Negotiating in the Shadows, supra note 8, at 249-250 (arguing that the research on
women's double bind in negotiation suffers from limitations).
48 See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 33; Francine M. Deutsch,
Undoing Gender, 21 GENDER & SOC. 106, 108 (2007) ("[The doing gender approach
implies that if gender is constructed, then it can be deconstructed. Gendered institutions
can be changed, and the social interactions that support them can be undone.").
4 SHELL, supra note 2 at 15. Additionally, Charles Craver's writing purports to
describe "real" differences between male and female negotiators in respect of trust
building, orientations to lying, levels of comfort with competitive situations, language
use and spatial distance, formal education as a mitigating factor, views on appropriate
15
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behavior, which leads them to offer advice about how men and women can
negotiate more effectively. The typical prescription in these studies is that
men and women should learn to anticipate and regenerate individual,
interactional, and institutional forces in a controlled and constructive manner,
consistent with the precepts of principled negotiation, so as to exploit others'
expectations of their ability and expand their strategic repertoire.o
Selected research findings on sex/gender differences in bargaining
behavior are summarized in the chart below. To preface, certain of these
studies reflect negotiation trends among discrete samples or populations only
(e.g., students, lawyers, or high-level managers), or under specific conditions
only (e.g., in distributive or integrative games, real life or simulated
exercises, salary or employment negotiations), and do not claim to speak for
all male and female negotiators at all times. Further, the cross-disciplinary
study of gender and sexuality is evolving more rapidly than the theory and
practice of principled negotiation, which means that to the extent these
studies reproduce the problematic methodology of the sex/gender
framework, theorize the origin of gender differences in individual rather than
interactional or institutional dynamics, or otherwise fail to interrogate the
politics of their findings, they may have diminished relevance or at least
require qualification in light of more recent work, which the authors of these
studies might very well acknowledge elsewhere."' The chart elides these
dynamics in concrete columns like "separate spheres," in the same
dichotomous M/F structure that originates the traditional feminist approaches
to gender in prescriptive negotiation analysis.
bargaining outcomes, and personal attacks. See CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL
NEGOTIATION, supra note 8, at 270; Craver, The Impact of Gender, supra note 8, at 346-
353.
50 See DEBORAH M. KOLB & JUDITH WILIAMS, THE SHADOW NEGOTIATION: How
WOMEN CAN MASTER THE HIDDEN AGENDAS THAT DETERMINE BARGAINING SUCCESS
129 (2000); Kolb, More Than Just a Footnote, supra note 39, at 351-352; Menkel-
Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution, supra note 30, at 6.
51 See generally Deborah M. Kolb & K. L. McGinn, Beyond Gender and
Negotiation to Gendered Negotiations, 2 NEGOT. AND CONFLICT MAN. RES. 1, 1-3 (2009)
(explaining that laboratory research on gender in negotiation has focused on individual
differences rather than "second generation" gender issues); Kolb, Too Bad for the
Women, supra note 8, at 519-20.
16
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Negotiation Traits and Tendencies by Sex/Gender
MALE / MASCULINE ("M")




Less likely to avoid competitive
situations and acknowledge
competitive wishes.
Ask for more and set higher targets.
Less risk averse.
Less eager to settle.
Use more direct language and less
disclaimers.
Use more dominant nonverbal signs.
9
FEMALE / FEMININE ("F")
Perform worse in competitive
environments.5 2
Choose to participate in competitive
interactions less often. 5
More likely to avoid competitive
situations and acknowledge
competitive wishes. 5
Ask for less and set lower targets.*
More risk averse. 6
More eager to settle.
Use more tentative and deferential
language.
Use less dominant nonverbal signs.5
52 See Bowles et al., supra note 41, at 953; Croson & Gneezy, supra note 37, at 18-
21.
" See Muriel Niederle & Lisa Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition?
Do Men Compete Too Much? 122 Q. J. OF ECON. 1067, 1096-1100 (2007).
54 See Irene P. Stiver, Work Inhibitions in Women: Clinical Considerations 2
(Wellesley College, Working Paper, 1983); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions:
Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1550-1551 (1993);
BABCOCK & LASCREVER, supra note 39, at 102-103; Fiona Greig, Propensity to
Negotiate and Career Advancement: Evidence from an Investment Bank that Women are
on a "Slow Elevator, " 24 NEGOT. J. 495, 496-497 (2008).
55 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 1-4.
56 See id at 138; See Croson & Gneezy, supra note 37 at 7; BABCOCK &
LASCHEVER, supra note 47, at 32.
5 See Feidakis & Tsaoussi, supra note 8, at 560.
5 See Larry R. Smeltzer & Kittie W. Watson, Gender Differences in Verbal
Communication During Negotiations, 3 COMM. RES. REP. 74, 78 (1986); DEBORAH
TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT! How CONVERSATION STYLE MAKES OR BREAKS
RELATIONSHIPS 71-73 (1986); Deborah Kolb & Gloria Coolidge, Her Place at the Table:
A Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
PRACTICE 20-21 (J. William Breslin & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., 1991); Lynn Smith-Lovin
& Dawn T. Robinson, Gender and Conversational Dynamics, in GENDER, INTERACTION,
AND INEQUALITY 122, 124-26 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992), SCHAPIRO, supra note 34,
at 68.
59 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 105.
17
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MALE / MASCULINE ("M")
Use louder voices and consider loud
voices to be less aggressive.




Exert more control over the subject
matter.
Use more threats and derogatory
put-downs.
Achieve better outcomes in
distributive negotiations.
Emphasize abstract and objective
criteria in their dealings with other
people.
More concerned about winning.
FEMALE / FEMININE ("F")
Use softer voices and consider loud
voices to be more aggressive. 60
Speak for shorter periods of time.6 1
Interrupted more frequently. 62
Downplay certainty during
63conversations.
Exert less control over the subject
matter. 0
Use less threats and derogatory put-
downs. 65
Achieve worse outcomes in
distributive negotiations. 66
Emphasize relational needs in their
dealings with other people. 67
More concerned about maintaining a
good relationship with the other side.
68
6 See LEONARD J. SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 18 (2006).
61 See KAY DEAUX, THE BEHAVIOR OF WOMEN AND MEN 60 (1976); Melvin J.
Kimmel et al, Effects of Trust, Aspiration, and Gender on Negotiation Tactics, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 9, 22 (1980); DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND
DISCOURSE 53-77 (1994); Kolb & Coolidge, supra note 58, at 69.
62 See DEAUX, supra note 61; TANNEN, supra note 61; DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING
FROM NINE TO FIVE: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSATIONAL STYLES AFFECT WHO
GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT GETS DONE AT WORK 293 (1994).
63 See TANNEN, supra note 61, at 35-36.
' See DEAUX, supra note 61, at 60; TANNEN, supra note 61, at 53-77.
65 See Kimmel et al., supra note 61, at 21-22.
' See Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 8, at 673-674; Russell Korobkin & Joseph
Doherty, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 162, 198
(2009).
67 See Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Gender, Legal Education, and Legal Careers, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (1991).
68 See RUBIN & BROWN, supra note 7, at 173; Kray & Babcock, supra note 42, at
205; Feidakis & Tsaoussi, supra note 8, at 560; Karen E. Lauterbach & Bryan J. Weiner,
18
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MALE / MASCULINE ("M")
I
Value equitable distributions that
reflect pertinent power imbalances.
Divide resources in a self-serving
way.
More win-lose oriented.
Initiate negotiations more often.
More positively disposed toward
negotiation.
More likely to negotiate for
themselves.
Negotiate more often for salary
increases and promotions.
Feel more confident and successful.
FEMALE / FEMININE ("F")
Value equal distributions even when
possessing greater economic
strength.69
Divide resources in an equal way. 70
More win-win oriented. .71
Initiate negotiations less often.72
Less positively disposed toward
negotiation.
Less likely to negotiate for
themselves.74
Negotiate less often for salary
increases and promotions.75
Feel less confident and successful.6
Dynamics of Upward Influence: How Male and Female Managers Get Their Way, 7
LEADERSHIP Q. 87, 102 (1996);
69 See Linda D. Molm & Mark Hedley, Gender, Power, and Social Exchange, in
GENDER, INTERACTION, AND INEQUALITY 1, 4 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992); ROY J.
LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATIONS 330 (2d ed. 1994); Catherine Eckel et al., Gender and
Negotiation in the Small: Are Women (Perceived to Be) More Cooperative Than Men?
24 NEGOT. J. 429, 441 (2008).
7o See Werner Guth, Carsten Schmidt, & Matthias Sutter, Bargaining Outside the
Lab - A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game 117 ECON. J. 449,
464 (2007).
7 See Kolb, Too Bad for the Women, supra note 8, at 520-521; BABCOCK &
LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 164-172.
72 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 1-3; Deborah Small, Michele
Gelfand, Linda Babcock, & Hilary Gettman, Who Gets to the Bargaining Table? The
Influence of Gender and Framing on the Initiation ofNegotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 600, 600-613 (2007).
7 See Small et al., id., at 610; BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 114; Kray
& Babcock, supra note 42, at 203.
7" See Lauterbach & Weiner, supra note 68, at 102-103; BABCOCK & LASCHEVER,
supra note 39, at 2-4.
75 See SHELL, supra note 2, at 114.
76 See Carol Watson, Gender Versus Power as a Predictor of Negotiation Behavior
and Outcomes, 10 NEGOT. J. 117, 122 (1994); Sylvia Beyer & Edward M. Bowden,
Gender Diferences in Self-Perceptions: Convergent Evidence from Three Measures of
19
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MALE / MASCULINE ("M") FEMALE / FEMININE ("F")
Feel higher self-efficacy about Feel lower self-efficacy about
negotiating ability. negotiating ability.77
After these studies assume, test, and conclude the validity of M/F as
illustrated above, they may or may not take a critical turn by attempting to
challenge the sex/gender framework and remedy perceived deficiencies in
the principled negotiation model. Where they do so, these are generally
progressive efforts to correct unfair or unequal bargaining processes or
outcomes that have been observed between women and men, often framed as
the result of legal and professional standards that historically favor so-called
"men's ways" over "women's ways" of negotiating as identified in the chart
above. This reflects an ideological commitment to exposing the incidents of
sex/gender inequality that devalue or subordinate female/feminine traits and
tendencies in principled negotiation theory and practice (M over F, or "M >
F").78
The most convincing argument in this vein is that consensual forms of
ADR actually support, rather than subvert, the adversarial and masculinist
structure of the common law system. On this theory, principled negotiation is
more appropriately termed "litigotiation" 79 or "bargaining in the shadow of
the law"o8 because its most effective practice manifest in the four key
precepts reproduces a process bias that favors instrumental, rational, rights-
Accuracy and Bias, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 157, 167-168 (1997);
ROGER VOLKEMA, LEVERAGE: How TO GET IT AND How To KEEP IT IN ANY
NEGOTIATION 154 (2006); Muriel Neiderle & Lise Vesterlund, Gender Differences in
Competition, 24 NEGOT. J. 447, 460 (2008) [hereinafter Neiderle & Vesterlund, Gender
Differences].
77 See Cynthia Kay Stevens, et al., Gender Diferences in the Acquisition of Salary
Negotiation Skills: The Role of Goals, Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Control, 78 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 723, 724 (1993).
78 HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 4-5.
7 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 20, at 1341-42 ("Rather than two separate
tracks - adjudication on the one hand and negotiation and settlement on the other - there
is a single process of pursuing remedies in the presence of courts. For mnemonic
purposes, we attach to it the fanciful neologism 'litigotiation."').
80 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979) (explaining their titular concept that
differently interested parties will negotiate agreements in polycentric decision-making
contexts that are informed by the parties' sense of the enforceable and unenforceable,
legal and social rules and standards looming in the background). See also Galanter &
Cahill, id, at 1349.
20
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oriented, and other male/masculine ethics reflected in the litigation model
more broadly."i Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains that the basic values
underlying the litigation model are advocacy, persuasion, hierarchy,
competition, and binary results (win/lose), extending from the courtroom to
the boardroom, which affect the ways that lawyers advise their clients
("maximize your returns"), structure transactions ("draft this to your
advantage"), and negotiate disputes ("anchor high," "hide your weaknesses,"
"hit them where it hurts").8 2 It follows that because social structures in the
legal and business professions are male-defined and dominated,83 they create
principled negotiation standards that are reiterative of gender hierarchy,
incongruous with women's unique moral development, or incompatible with
female and feminine models of professional achievement. This may impact
women's ability to negotiate effectively in practice so long as standards of
"effectiveness" are prescribed by these male/masculine structures. For
example, research suggests that women place greater emphasis on
relationships and are more likely to make substantive concessions to
maintain them.' However, the first precept of principled negotiation,
"separate the people over the problem," teaches that the key to maintaining
relationships is not by making concessions but by tackling people problems
1 Feminist scholars have criticized the principled negotiation model for reflecting
male norms. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About Gender, supra note 18, at
359; Justine Kirby, Would Principled Negotiation Have Saved Eve: A Feminist Analysis
of Getting to YES, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 122, 126-139 (1997); Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 337, 341 (1990).
82 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39, 51 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice;]; see also Kolb, Too Bad for the Women, supra
note 8, at 518 ("Also embedded in this work is the unquestioned idea that higher salaries,
more aggressive negotiation behavior, and greater personal confidence are normatively
'better' when arguments could be made-and research has been done-to challenge
these cultural assumptions.").
81 See Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal
Academy, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 333, 349 (1996) (arguing that law is seen rational,
objective, abstract, logical/analytical, and rigorous, which characteristics are more often
attributed to men than to women); Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 454-55 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (attributing the high
value that society places on law, in part, on the fact that women were long excluding
from practicing it).
" See Bonnie R. Kasten, Separate Strengths: How Men and Women Manage
Conflict and Competition, in NOT AS FAR AS You THINK: THE REALITIES OF WORKING
WOMEN 132 (Lynda L. Moore ed., 1986); WILLIAM F. MORRISON & HENRY H. CALERO,
THE HUMAN SIDE OF NEGOTIATIONS 196 (1994).
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85directly, thereby creating a benchmark that disadvantages women.
Similarly, Deborah Kolb and Judith Williams have criticized the fourth
precept, they "insist that the result be based on some objective standard," for
its being unreflective of women's distinct experience:
Standards generally reflect the experience of the people
setting them. And, by and large, men do the setting in our
society. As a result, their experience becomes the yard stick
for measuring what is normal. And, in a masked exercise of
power, that standard is then rather cavalierly assumed to be
gender neutral.'
These arguments suggest that so-called "gender-neutral"87  principled
negotiation standards explicitly or implicitly reward male/masculine
behaviors over and at the expense of female or feminine behaviors.
Therefore, women may be socially, culturally, and legally disadvantaged at
any bargaining table established on these standards.
Of course, there is writing in the principled negotiation field that accepts
the inequality of M > F as a fact without taking the critical turn-for
example, writing that assumes, tests, or concludes that women are (or are
perceived to be) less effective negotiators than men as a condition of their
sex/gender by looking only to the individual and not the interpersonal or
85 FIsHER, URY & PATrON, supra note 2, at 21.
86 KOLB & WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 26.
8 See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 644-645 (1983); CATHARINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, 54-55 (1987); Ann Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L. J. 1373, 1377 (1986)
("[A]bstract universality ... made maleness the norm of what is human, and did so sub
rosa, all in the name of neutrality."). See generally Meredith Render, Misogyny,
Androgyny, and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed
World, 29 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 99, 107-108 (2006) (explaining how the gradual
breakdown of facial restrictions on women led to laws and policies increasingly being
framed in "gender-blind" terms, under which men continued to enjoy categorically
preferred status). The same criticism has been levelled at facially "gender-neutral" or
"gender-blind" employment criteria in the legal profession generally, as manifest in
lawyer Nancy O'Mara Ezold's landmark sex discrimination lawsuit against her former
firm respecting its assessment of her "legal analytic ability." See Ezold v. Wolf Block,
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993),
cited in CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 168-169 (2d ed., 2007) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY]. For additional feminist critiques of "gender-neutrality" in
the alternative dispute resolution context, see, e.g., Hill, supra note 81, at 341, 356-362;
Kirby, supra note 81, at 136-139; Kolb & Coolidge, supra note 58, at 261-271.
22
[Vol. 33:1 20181
THE FEMINIST NEGOTIATOR'S DIEMMA
institutional levels for an explanation of why women are in deficit-either by
omission or for its own political or pedagogical reasons.8 8 But even this work
is typically directed at the same objective as the more progressive
scholarship. That is, to bring about an idealized vision in which both sexes
(i.e., all women and all men) achieve more fair and equal bargaining
processes and outcomes in practice, even if this means we value gendered
masculine and feminine behaviors unequally in setting principled negotiation
benchmarks, by specifically advancing the cause of women at the bargaining
table. Therefore, to the extent this scholarship opposes M > F and frames its
politics as a female or feminine emancipation project, it may be said that it is
"feminist" as it "carries a brief for F."89 This much is clear and should be at
least be generally agreed, but there is less consensus among scholars about
what feminist negotiation looks like in practice, who should be responsible
for it, and how it can be achieved.
C. Traditional Approaches to Sex/Gender Diference in
Principled Negotiation
Working from the assumption that sex/gender difference in bargaining
behavior exists, many feminist reformers continue to offer prescriptive
negotiation advice about how to achieve more fair and equal bargaining
processes and outcomes between women and men. The main divide appears
to be whether women should conform to a historically male/masculine model
of behavior that is fundamentally entrenched in society and/or seen as
intrinsically good, or whether the law and business worlds should innovate
and adopt an ethically female/feminine model of behavior as a substitute or
supplementary perspective on how to conduct negotiations.9
1. LIBERAL FEMINIST NEGOTIATION
The first approach to sex/gender difference in principled negotiation
retains its central holding in many academic, professional, and more
practice-oriented legal publications under various guises-that is the liberal
feminist negotiation theme, 'fix the woman." At a high level, liberal
" See, e.g., Korobkin & Doherty, supra note 66, at 184, 191-194 (describing the
results of a study suggesting there are stark differences in negotiation performance
between men and women).
89 HALLEY, SPLrr DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 4-5.
* Deborah Kolb and Judith Williams characterize these two approaches to gender in
negotiation as "Professor Higgins' Advice" and "The Steel Magnolias' Answer." See
KOLB & WILLIAMS, supra note 50, at 24-26.
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feminism holds to the basic ideals of liberalism: freedom of choice and
formal equality of opportunity in the marketplace.9' Women must be free
from sources of constraint so that they are permitted to live self-determining
and productive lives as men do, regardless of sex.92 But once these
constraints are removed, any more radical and substantive equality objective
to dismantle the gender hierarchies present at the structural level may fade
away unnoticed, or at least be added to a long list of ancillary concerns in the
liberal economy that should not be the prime mover of our legal,
professional, or political organization.9 3
" Liberal feminism embraces the basic of tenets of liberalism, including the
assumptions that humans are autonomous, rational, self-maximizing agents, liberty is the
priority, rights deserve protection, and privacy should be supported. See Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) [hereinafter West,
Jurisprudence and Gender] (positing that liberal legalism reflects "an existential state of
highly desirable and much valued freedom."). Liberal feminism embraces a vision of
women's formal equality within the current social, cultural, and legal structure, achieving
empowerment through women's rights and women's solidarity movements. See Mary
Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U CHI.
LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999) ("Liberal feminism assumes that people are autonomous
individuals making decisions in their own self-interest . . ."); Linda C. McClain,
"Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1175 n.10 (1992) (describing how liberal feminist principles motivate
litigation strategies advocating formal equality for women). For a cross-section of liberal
feminist deployments in the law, see generally Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child
Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 101-102 (1993);
Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between
Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 49, 97-
98 (1993); Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning Consensual
Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 269, 292 (1996); Martha
Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 157,
157 (2010); Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1332-38 (2013); Cyra
Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism's Visions of the
"Progress" of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALT. L. F. 153, 153 (2009).
' See Becker, supra note 91 ("The solution to inequality between women and men
is to offer individuals the same choices regardless of sex.") Arguably, under American
constitutional equality doctrine that is founded on liberalism, women are afforded equal
access to traditionally male institutions to the extent they can prove they are similarly
situated as men by assimilating the male norm. See generally Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1292 (1987); Valorie K. Vojdik,
Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 68, 84 (2002).
9 See Frances E.Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1544-1552 (1983) [hereinafter Olsen, The Family and
the Market] ("Reformers generally conceive of antidiscrimination law as a strategy to
enable women to participate in the market as freely and effectively as men do .... The
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In the dispute resolution context, liberal feminism is reflected in
prescriptions that find strong pressures to meet male-defined and dominated
standards in the legal and business professions should operate to minimize,
rather than emphasize, female/feminine traits and tendencies at the
bargaining table. This theory finds that women are less effective than men in
the individualistic, rough-and-tumble world of principled negotiation,
whether because of their unique social development or the historically
conciliatory, mothering roles that they are groomed to play. Reforming
gender hierarchy in the system is idealistic, impractical, or otherwise beside
the point because this is "real life" and women need to know the "rules of the
game." Therefore, liberal feminists argue that women should methodically
assimilate male or masculine behaviors to better equip themselves for
bargaining tasks in the market economy.9 4
On this theory, the consequences of women's failure to assimilate are
apparently quite dire. Beyond the worldly impacts, Justine Kirby asks
whether a liberal feminist approach to principled negotiation (which she calls
the "pragmatic feminist" approach) would have "saved" Eve from the
serpent's deception and prevented original sin. Eve could not resist the
serpent, Kirby suggests, because she had not stopped to probe his underlying
interests, objectively assess his information, and evaluate her alternatives
before eating the forbidden fruit. If only Eve had remembered this advice,
she might have averted women's most "infamous negotiation failure"95 and
not corrupted the natural world:
A "pragmatic feminist" approach, while acknowledging the
broader societal context and recognizing that "female"
characteristics have been devalued, focuses instead on
practical steps that might improve the lot of women
negotiators....
reforms, however, do not go far enough toward real equality or empowerment of women.
Moreover, they encourage market individualism. Antidiscrimination law does not end the
actual subordination of women in the market but instead mainly benefits a small
percentage of women who adopt "male" roles. Meanwhile, it legitimates the continued
oppression of most women: the reforms maintain the status quo by particularizing and
privatizing inequality and encouraging women to blame themselves for their failures in
the market.") Id at 1542
" Mary Anne Case summarizes the appeal of liberal feminism as follows: "The
masculine woman is today more readily accepted. Wanting to be masculine is
understandable; it can be a step up for a woman, and the qualities associated with
masculinity are also associated with success." See Case, supra note 46, at 3.
9 Kirby, supra note 81, at 122.
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* preparation is especially important for women
negotiators. In preparing for a negotiation, women
should pay particular attention to their interests by
asking how they feel about the issues likely to arise and
exploring why they feel that way. By recognizing and
(where justified) validating such concerns, women may
feel more confident in pursuing their own interests in
negotiation;
* women should be wary of seeking to empathise with
and understand others' perspectives if there is no
reciprocity-this could alter the balance of power in the
negotiation to their disadvantage. One possible
technique to encourage each negotiator to listen and
understand the others is to ask each negotiator to
summarise the other negotiators' interests;
* negotiators should ensure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to speak. It may even be necessary to go so
far as to allocate time in which each person can speak
without interruption (except for minor points of
clarification);
* women negotiators should be conscious of the different
speaking styles typical of men and women, practise
using a variety of styles and use different styles in
various contexts to achieve the desired effect. For
example, when a negotiator wishes to emphasize a
point, a direct "male" speaking style may be more
effective than a more equivocal "female" speaking
style. Women should also be conscious of societal
expectations-and conform with or violate these
depending on which approach is likely to be more
effective in the circumstances'
* women should be aware of their "emotions" during
negotiation, as well as "rational" arguments. For
example, if a negotiator feels uncomfortable about a
seemingly "rational" proposal, she should consider
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* in inventing options for mutual gain, women negotiators
should ensure that they promote options that further
their own interests as well as others' interests and
* in suggesting "objective" criteria, women should
consider how different criteria distribute value.
However, using the language of "objectivity" may be
helpful in some circumstances.96
While Kirby acknowledges the preceding strategies may not be suitable for
all women in all legal and business contexts,9 7 it certainly seems she would
advise as a practical matter that women should take off their relationship-
colored glasses and check their motherly concern at the boardroom door.
Kirby is not alone in this. Other liberal feminist commentators have argued
that women should "ask" for more,98 try to embrace competition,99 "lean
in,"is communicate more directly and authoritatively,' speak in a lower
tone,'02 and "smile less often and only deliberately"0 3 during legal and
' Kirby, supra note 81, at 141-142 (italics in original, underlining added).
97 Id.
9 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39, at 9-10 ("Asking for what you want
is the essential first step that kicks off a negotiation. If you miss your chance to negotiate,
the best negotiation advice in the world isn't going to help you much. And women
simply aren't asking at the same rate as men.") Id at 10.
' See Neiderle & Vesterlund, Gender Differences, supra note 76, at 457-458
(describing the design of an experiment attempting to answer the question, "Can We
Entice Women to Compete?").
1" This phrase is borrowed from the self-identified feminist manual, SHERYL
SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013), and its associated
programming. The text remains hugely popular among women and others despite the
criticism that its message is neoliberal "faux-feminist". See e.g., bell hooks, Dig Deep:
Beyond Lean In, THE FEMINIST WIRE (October 28, 2013), available at
http://thefeministwire.com/2013/10/17973/ ("Ironically, Sandberg's work would not have
captured the attention of progressives, particularly men, if she had not packaged the
message of "lets go forward and work as equals within white male corporate elites" in the
wrapping paper of feminism. ... Importantly, whether feminist or not, we all need to
remember that visionary feminist goal which is not of a woman running the world as is,
but a women doing our part to change the world so that freedom and justice, the
opportunity to have optimal well-being, can be equally shared by everyone - female and
male.").
o Kolb & Coolidge, supra note 58, at 69.
' See Marjorie Corman Aaron, Strategy at the Negotiation Table: From
Stereotypes to Subtleties, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Apr. 2012, at 83, 91 ("We
unconsciously associate power and authority with larger size, greater strength, deeper
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business negotiations. To quote Fortune magazine's recommended rules for
professional women: "Look like a lady; act like a man; work like a dog."1
In this way, liberal feminist negotiation appears to be a one-way street:
men's place is static, women's place is shifting, and women have a long way
to go. This means M/F, M > F, and we should carry a brief for F by
prescribing that women act male/masculine: F 4 M.
2. CULTURAL FEMINIST NEGOTIATION
The second approach to sex/gender difference in principled negotiation
has gained greater purchase in the critical legal literature for its politically
transgressive premises- that is the cultural feminist negotiation theme, "fix
the system around the woman." Cultural feminism is a strand of radical
feminism that demands in its vision the upheaval of gender hierarchical
structures in law and in life. The intention is to explore the nature of
women's perspectives, reconstructing and revalorizing experiences that have
been suppressed and may have real and profound redemptive power.0 5
This work builds on the contribution of educational psychologist Carol
Gilligan, who argues in her ground-breaking text, In a Different Voice, that
representations of men's moral development are teleologically aimed toward
an "ethic of justice," as opposed to the "ethic of care" as she observed in
representations of women's moral development.106 Gilligan concludes that
voice, confidence, and age ... And men are typically larger and stronger, have lower
voices, and more often employ communication patterns associated with confidence.").
103 Id. at 92.
10 Jaclyn Fierman, Why Women Still Don't Hit the Top, FORTUNE, July 1990.
105 See generally Alice Echols, The New Feminism of Yin and Yang, in POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 439-59 (Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, & Sharon
Thompson eds., 1983) (applying the term "cultural feminism" to the growing trend
within feminism in the late 1970s and 80s toward the essentialism and upward
(re)evaluation of feminine values). See also Alice Echols, The Taming of the Id: Feminist
Sexual Politics, 1968-83, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 50-
72 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1983).
106 GILLIGAN, supra note 34, at 19-26, 29 (putting Lawrence Kohlberg's Heinz
dilemma to groups of boys and girls, Gilligan asked whether a man should steal a drug to
save his wife's life when a pharmacist demands a price the man cannot afford. She found
that for boys, the moral problem arises because they frame the issue in terms of
conflicting rights in property and life, leading to the formal and abstract solution that the
man should steal the drug; for girls, the moral problem arises because they frame the
issue in terms of conflicting responsibilities, leading to the contextual and narrative
solution the man should either borrow money from someone or persuade the pharmacist
to give him the drug for free by explaining the severity of his wife's condition).
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men and boys tend to experience themselves as separately identified
individuals guided by law, logic, and rights ("ethic of justice"), while women
and girls experience themselves through relationships with others as part of a
broader web of concern ("ethic of care").107 Many cultural feminists argue
that male/masculine values in the exercise of moral reasoning (objectivity,
self-interestedness) are deficient, but continue to enjoy a privileged place in
society at the expense of female/feminine values (subjectivity, connectivity)
through gender hierarchies.108 Gilligan locates the social and cultural "origins
of aggression"-and, it follows, the origins of the adversarial system-in a
gendered masculine "failure of connection."'" Cultural feminists believe that
if men and women reinstituted the female/feminine "ethic of care" as our
moral foundation,110 the law and business professions would be reformed for
the better, whether by moderating or dismantling the litigation model,
challenging liberal conceptions of freedom and autonomy, or moving away
from an individual rights-based framework altogether."
1' See generally id. But see JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL
ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993) (advocating for the detachment of gender and
the ethic of care).
108 See e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 34, at 32 ("[The male's stance] abstracts the moral
problem from the interpersonal situation, finding in the logic of fairness an objective way
to decide who will win the dispute."); Id at 30 ("[The female's] world is a world of
relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between
people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a perception of the
need for response ... . [Women] see the actors in the dilemma arrayed not as opponents
in a contest of rights but as members of a network of relationships on whose continuation
they all depend.").
'" Id at 173. But see Lloyd Burton et al, Feminist Theory, Professional Ethics, and
Gender-Related Distinctions in Attorney Negotiating Styles, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 199,
242-245 (1991) (trying to replicate Gilligan's findings by mapping her "ethic of justice"
and "ethic of care" onto competitive and collaborative bargaining orientations,
respectively, finding only modest support for the correlation).
110 Compare GILLIGAN, supra note 34, at 174 ("[A] marriage between adult
development as it is currently portrayed and women's development as it begins to be
seen could lead to a changed understanding of human development and a more
generative view of human life."), with ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 280 (1997)
[hereinafter WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE] ("[T]he suggestion that women - and therefore
the human community - can and should respond in a more nurturant, caring, and natural
way to the needs of those who are weaker, is . . . one promise, among others, that the
human community can be reconstituted in a way that will salvage the planet as well as
save the species.")
." See Scales, supra note 87, at 1383; WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 110,
at 277-278. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 82; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986);
Deborah L. Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View, " 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39 (1988); Paul J.
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In the dispute resolution context, cultural feminism is a theory that sees
great potential in a women's "different voice" to bring unrecognized benefits
to the principled negotiation process, such as an increased focus on building
relationships and earning trust through skills like active listening,
information sharing, and empathy which are likely to assist parties to
generate creative options and reach mutually-beneficial compromises.12
These same concerns are manifest in the "dual concern" model of
negotiation: for men and women to satisfy their own interests in mutual-
gains bargains (i.e., not zero-sum games), they should demonstrate a
typically female/feminine concern for the interests of other parties."'
Menkel-Meadow makes this appeal most famously and persuasively:
Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum:
The Logic ofJake's Ladder in the Context ofAmy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1988);
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 91; Judith C. Areen, A Need for Caring, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1988); Johanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on
Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 99 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, in
3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 196, 230-32 (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1989); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Diferences:
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990); Leslie Bender,
From Gender Diference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of
Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); McClain, supra note 91; Stephen Ellmann, The
Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L. J. 2665 (1993); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, What's Gender Got to Do With It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of
Care, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
What's Gender Got to Do With It?]; Erika Rackley, From Arachne to Charlotte: An
Imaginative Revisiting of Gilligan's In a Different Voice, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 751 (2006-2007); Neil Cobb, Compulsory Care-Giving: Some Thoughts on Relational
Feminism, the Ethics of Care and Omissions Liability, 39 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11 (2008).
112 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law:
Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 621, 639 (1994); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 797-801; FISHER, URY,
& PATTON, supra note 2, at 167 ("Some research suggests that women are more likely
than men to gather information in a more open and less structured way, to be more
sensitive to relationships, and to operate on a morality that is based proportionately more
on caring and obligations to others and less on rules and individual rights.. . . See, as a
starting point, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice.").
11 See DEAN G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICT
105-18 (1993) (explaining the "dual concern" model is designed to predict the type of
negotiation strategy that a person might choose based on the party's concern about her
own outcomes and about her counterpart's outcomes); Christine Rack, Negotiated
Justice: Gender and Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in the Metrocourt Study, 20
HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 211, 218-236 (1999); Larry Crump & Jeff Giddings,
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[T]he growing strength of women's voice in the legal
profession may change the adversarial system into a more
cooperative, less war-like system of communication between
disputants in which solutions are mutually agreed upon
rather than dictated by an outsider, won by the victor, and
imposed upon the loser."4
This is a progressive vision of structural change in the legal system,
motivated by a desire to see dispute resolution processes "promot[e] and
maximize[e] human interactions that are creative, enfranchising, enriching,
and empowering, rather than alienating and conflict-provoking.".s If we
extend the metaphor, cultural feminist negotiation is also a one-way street,
but it runs the opposite way: women's place is static, men's place is shifting,
and men have a long way to go. This means M/F, M > F, and we should
carry a brief for F by reversing normative value judgments and prescribing
that men act female feminine: F > M and M - F.
D. Moving Beyond the Traditional Approaches
Against this critical backdrop and with the rapid institutionalization of
ADR in American and Canadian legal procedure, more and more law and
business schools are offering students the opportunity to learn the practice of
principled negotiation, including the role of gender as a determinant of
bargaining behavior in supervised experiential and clinical settings."'6
Correspondingly, the traditional feminist approaches to sex/gender difference
114 Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice, supra note 82 at 54-55.
1"5 Supra note 4 at 763. In the wake of subsequent developments in feminist legal
theory, Menkel-Meadow moderated her views on the transgressive potential of women's
ethic of care in the law after publishing Portia in a Different Voice; however, she has
maintained that the ethic of care suggests a number of interesting implications for legal
reform. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender,
Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75 (1994-1995); Menkel-Meadow,
What's Gender Got to Do With It?, supra note 111.
"6 Although lacking the transformative effects that its founders had predicted,
virtually all law schools and many business schools in the United States and Canada now
offer students the opportunity to learn ADR skills in a setting designed to focus
simultaneously on the theory and practice of negotiation. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Legacy of Clinical Legal Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 555 (1980); Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections
on Clinical Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (Counsel
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, 1973).
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in prescriptive negotiation analysis have found increasing purchase in law
and business classrooms, where they continue to form part of basic skills
training and shape professional outcomes everywhere. Prescriptions are
historically based in an instructor's practical or political leanings: at bottom,
liberal feminist negotiation amounts to women learning "men's ways" to fix
themselves, while cultural feminist negotiation amounts to men learning
"women's ways" to fix themselves and the system. The approaches lend
themselves to corresponding negotiation "best practices" and classroom
pedagogies that are widely accepted.
Having worked as a litigation lawyer and having studied, taught, and
observed others teach about sex/gender difference in negotiation at several
American and Canadian law schools, I understand how the traditional
prescriptions are reflected in experiential lesson planning. My observation is
that these lessons usually fail to capture the complexity of the issues at hand
and have offended negotiation students, as a result, more than they led them
to critique the role of gender in a productive way. I hope that this experience
spurs others to ask whether liberal and cultural feminist negotiation, at least
as they are historically conceived, may be psychically limiting and therefore
detrimental to women and men in legal and business practice as well as
politically problematic in ways that are readily apparent to students and
others. In my view, these problems may be remedied if legal and business
professionals conceptually allow for, conduct our practice in, and write and
teach about situations in which it is useful to move beyond the traditional
approaches.
To describe my experience at one leading law school, I have seen a
revolving door of guest lecturers on the role of gender in negotiation, many
employed as practitioners or consultants to white-shoe law firms and
corporations, cycle through the classroom year after year. Their presentations
were consistently panned. The most frequent objection was from students
who felt misrepresented by lecturers' overbroad statements that "all women
are and therefore should . . . " or "all men are and therefore should . . . "
meant to apply widely and irrespective of individual or group differences.
For example, I heard one instructor explain that "statistics show women are
more conciliatory than men;""7 therefore, women should ask for what they
want,"' "be as aggressive as the men on their team," and "not be afraid to
'lean into' professional salary negotiations.""9 This kind of acritical,
' See supra notes 53, 54, and accompanying text.118 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 39; BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note
47.




THE FEMINIST NEGOTIATOR'S DILEMMA
instrumentalist advice is suggestive of the liberal feminist approach to
negotiation. After the class, many students complained that this advice failed
to take account of their more complicated and uniquely lived experiences as
women, racialized minorities, or LGBTQ-to give three examples-because
a racialized woman and a trans woman, let alone a racialized trans woman,120
cannot simply "lean into" salary negotiations in the same way as a white
cisgender woman when it may not be safe, productive, or even possible to do
so. Another popular complaint was that the instructor's advice failed to
recognize how structural barriers in society have limited women's pathways
for success. These students asked why women were being told to act more
aggressively (read: in a more masculine way) and to effectively follow the
"rules of the game" (read: abide by current legal and business conditions that
have impelled unfair and unequal bargaining processes and outcomes),
instead of trying to change the rules or suggest a different game that was
designed by and for the benefit of women or other historically marginalized
groups.
These observations are evidence of a crisis in principled negotiation
pedagogy today. Valuable learning opportunities are being lost because it is
apparently too difficult to find instructors with expertise in both feminism
and dispute settlement who can handle the subject matter of sex and gender
differences, an immensely important topic, with the required sensitivity to
generate thoughtful classroom discussion without significant controversy.
This should not be rare expertise. Indeed, the situation appears to be so grave
that several leading law and business schools have given up trying to teach
about sex and gender in principled negotiation entirely.21 The fact is
particularly striking if one considers that law and business teachers of other
subjects routinely explore controversial issues in social role theory,
oppositional ethics, sex inequality, and feminist reforms in a sophisticated
and meaningful way. Yet, it appears these issues as applied in the ADR
context raise unique and serious concerns for the future development of
experiential education in the United States and Canada.1 22
Contributing to the crisis is that many law and business schools still
place a low (or, in some cases, zero) hiring priority on the dispute resolution
field, such that their negotiation instructors are almost exclusively adjuncts
120See sources cited infra note 157 and accompanying text.
121 I have confirmed this fact and the reasons for it through conversations with law
professor colleagues across the United States and Canada.
122 Several negotiation scholars have offered valuable insights and recommendations
on experiential negotiation teaching as it relates to actual or perceived gender difference
in performance. See e.g. Menkel-Meadow, Teaching about Gender, supra note 18, at
364-370; Cohen, An (Un)Useful Category, supra note 10, at 191-196.
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drawn from the local litigation bar or consultancy population and not the
permanent enured or tenure-track faculty. These instructors may take a more
"pragmatic" view of the subject as Kirby does above, reproducing a quick-
fix, executive, "lunch and learn" teaching style based in their legal or
professional experience and normalizing bias. They may correspondingly
lack the necessary training in sex equality, critical race theory, queer studies,
and other fields to critically examine the traditional approaches to sex/gender
difference in principled negotiation, and specifically the liberal feminist
approach that bears down on women (and men) in the male-dominated legal
system and professional cultures in often subtle ways.'23 Or perhaps more
likely, they may have heard various criticisms of the traditional approaches,
but they have dismissed them as idealistic, impractical, or otherwise
irrelevant to teaching about negotiation in the "real world" where
methodologies founded on sex/gender difference continue to be practiced
and where overt or covert masculinist imperatives remain largely
unchallenged.
The pedagogical issues we are experiencing are symptomatic of a
constitutive theory problem with the traditional approaches as they are most
often studied, practiced, and taught in the United States and Canada. Put
simply, the imaginative constraints of the ontological principle of sex/gender
difference, M/F, have unduly limited our range of critical inquiry about the
role of sex and gender in principled negotiation theory and practice. To the
extent that researchers identify so-called "masculine" and "feminine" traits
or tendencies and attribute them to male and female bodies, it appears
inevitable that overbroad generalizations about gender determinants will be
made, leading to normative prescriptions about principled negotiation "best
practices" that do not apply to every negotiator.124 The binary M/F can tell us
little about gender non-conforming individuals who enact inconsistent,
potentially confusing, and conceptually novel gender forms, or individuals
whose gender expressions are filtered through one or more intersectional
identities or experiences, except to highlight their continued theoretic and
practical elision in principled negotiation studies. These individuals are the
" I am not the first comment on the need for lecturers on gender in principled
negotiation to have some familiarity with feminist legal studies. See Menkel-Meadow,
Teaching about Gender, supra note 18, at 360.
124 Many theories of gender difference that rely on statistical analysis for their
generalized and extrapolated propositions about men and women and the apparent causes
of sex and gender inequality suffer from essentializing tendencies. See Amy J. Cohen,
Must We Ask?: Revisiting the Role of Gender in Negotiating, 10 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 29,
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"gender-benders:" men and women who may be stereotypically masculine or
feminine or neither or both, whether by incident or inclination, but in their
defiance of statistical norms they are disappeared by ADR theories that
conflate birth-sex designations with fixed gender expectations.12 5 By calling
them into prominence, I hope to show that all male and female negotiators
should learn to gender-bend for themselves.
This is both a practical and political imperative. To the extent the
traditional approaches highlight real or perceived sex/gender difference
without interrogating the means of its construction, they effectively reinforce
gender hierarchy as a "natural" or "necessary" fact by perpetuating harmful
sex-based stereotypes that have traditionally disempowered all women and
gender-benders at the bargaining table.126 Separate spheres ideology has long
suggested that men are agentic, independently oriented, and concerned with
mastery and control, while women are communal, interpersonally oriented,
and concerned with the welfare of others.'27 And so the stereotype easily
125 See generally Case, supra note 46.
m See generally Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to
Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 489 (1990) ("Most stereotyping involves a
two-step process: categorization and attribution. The first step is the actual categorization
of individuals into groups, usually expressed as opposites . .. The second step involves
the attribution of certain traits (e.g., personality characteristics, intentions, goals,
motivations, attitudes) to persons by virtue of the group into which they have been
categorized. Sex stereotyping in the workplace is embedded in a complicated matrix of
interlocking beliefs that reflect this two-step process."). For critical applications of sex-
based stereotyping theory to female and feminine lawyering and dispute resolution
models, see Albert, supra note 45, at 295, 299-303; Naomi R. Cahn, Theoretics of
Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action: Styles of Lawyering, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1050-54 (1992); Scales, supra note 87, at 1380-1383.
127 See Sandra Lipsitz Bem, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J.
PSYCHOL. 155, 156-157 (1974). The Bem Sex-Role Inventory is the most frequently
cited measure in sex-role research. It lists the following qualities as identified masculine:
self-reliant, of strong personality, defends one's beliefs, forceful, independent, analytical,
athletic, possessing leadership abilities, assertive, and willing to take risks. The following
qualities are identified as feminine: affectionate, cheerful, compassionate, flatterable,
gentle, gullible, childlike, loyal, sensitive to others' needs, shy, soft spoken, sympathetic,
tender, understanding, warm, and yielding. For more on the content and construction of
sex-based stereotypes, including analyses in professional contexts, see generally
ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOBY & CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX
DIFFERENCES 228, 234 (1974); JOHN E. WILLIAMS & DEBORAH L. BEST, MEASURING SEX
STEREOTYPES: A MULTINATION STUDY (1990); Sallyanne Payton, Releasing Excellence:
Erasing Gender Zoning From the Legal Mind, 18 IND. L. REv. 629, 633 (1985); JOHN E.
WILLIAMS & DEBORAH L BEST,. MEASURING SEX STEREOTYPES: A MULTINATION STUDY
(1990); Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Gender, Legal Education and Legal Careers, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (1991); Laurie Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for
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follows that male negotiators are more assertive, interrupting, status
affirming, reliant on abstract reasoning and objective criteria, and more
effective at leveraging competitive, distributive bargaining, "hard power"
skills, while female negotiators listen more, pay greater attention to
emotional rapport, take turns when speaking, emphasize relationship
building, and are more effective at leveraging collaborative, integrative
bargaining, "soft power" skills. As outlined in the chart above, empirical
studies in negotiation that conflate sex/gender seem to reflect these widely-
held beliefs.'2 8 In a classic formulation, Richard Wasserstrom argued that
rigid sex/gender identities impose functional limits on what men and women
can and should become:
Any substantially non-assimilationist society will make
one's sexual identity an important characteristic, so that
there are substantial psychological, role, and status
differences between persons who are males and those who
are females. Even if these could be attained without systemic
dominance of one sex over the other, they would, I think, be
objectionable on the ground that they necessarily impaired
an individual's ability to develop his or her own
characteristics, talents, and capacities to the fullest extent to
which he or she might desire.12 9
In the dispute resolution context, the key to effective bargaining is the ability
to adapt personal "characteristics, talents, and capacities" unmoored from
sex/gender identities as only gender-benders can. And where we continue to
need progressive feminist interventions to address unfairness and inequality
Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629, 629-630 (1998); Madeline E. Heilman, Description
and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women's Ascent Up the
Organizational Ladder, 57 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 657, 658-670 (2001); Alice H. Eagly &
Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female Leaders, 109
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 573, 573-576 (2002).
128 Numerous scholars have warned that stereotypical assumptions about gender
difference influence the perceptions of both researchers and participants, often leading to
erroneous results and interpretations of them. See MACCOBY & JACKLIN, supra note 127,
at 3-8; CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: How OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND
NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE, xxiv-xxv (2010); REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG,
BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCE, xii-xiii (2010).
129 Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 614 (1976-1977).
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in bargaining processes and outcomes, one means of effective advocacy is
the ability to subvert sex gender identities as gender-benders can.
To be clear, my intention is not to refute the ontological structure of MIF
as a basis for critiquing interactional and institutional dynamics writ large, as
there is great potential in difference feminist theory to empower women in
the nominative category "F" to describe their distinct experience of identity,
morality, and ethics.i' Many difference feminists have done so and should
continue to do so by exposing the incidents of sex and gender inequality, M
> F, in many social and cultural contexts."' My claim is that because the
traditional approaches to sex/gender difference in principled negotiation
define their advocacy in terms of MIF, M > F, and carrying a brief for F
exclusively, they circumscribe the range of conceptual tools with which
negotiators may critically assess their bargaining behavior, expand their
strategic repertoire, and effect political change.132 As such, this article
explores alternative means of resistance not instead of difference feminism
necessarily, but in addition to it," 3 in order to direct more sustained critical
attention to the political discourses of gender in principled negotiation theory
and practice that may enable or constrain us from meeting our full potential.
13 Amy Cohen made the same point in her critique of gender in negotiation. See
Cohen, An (Un) Useful Category, supra note 10, at 191 ("[A]bandoning the idea of gender
as a social function of opposites is not the same as abandoning inquiry into gender
performance as a function of culture and social behavior.").
13 See Littleton, supra note 92, at 1333. (arguing that it is not the fact of real or
imagined gender difference that creates the divide between women and men, but the
differential impact that gender makes; if the identification of a person, action, tendency,
or trait as female or feminine did not entail her/his/its immediate devaluation, then the
identification itself would not be problematic).
132 As Judith Butler explains about identitarian feminist models that identity may be
powerfully transgressive where it produces a rallying point, F, in certain women's
solidarity contexts, but it may be powerfully limiting where identity operates as the
normalizing category of structures around F that oppress women in other contexts, such
as this, by limiting their access to conceptual tools. See Butler, Imitation and Gender,
supra note 11, at 13-14.
" I endorse what Biddy Martin has offered as a rationale for queer "postfeminist"
work. That is, to "suspend or defer questions about what [other lines of inquiry] have to
do with women or gender long enough to make our analysis of gender and sexuality [and
negotiation] new again and supple enough to help us intervene usefully in those
developments." See Martin, Success and its Failures, in BRONFEN & KAYKA, supra note
11, at 371.
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III. A POSTMODERN FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF GENDER IN PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION
A. Anti-Identitarian Theories and Applications
The traditional liberal and cultural feminist approaches to gender in
principled negotiation have features that work against the goal of increasing
the range of practical and political expressions available to women and men.
Chief among them, they presume that "sex/gender" is a reliable axis on
which to model dispute resolution processes. Both the imperatives that we
should "fix the woman" and "fix the system around the woman" imply that
the different sexes/genders are discernible, describable, and discrete; they are
socially constructed and therefore psychologically predictable. After all, the
underlying difference feminist theory would be problematized if the
elemental variables, M and F, were shown to be unfixed, unstable, or capable
of signifying multiply. This means that the traditional praxis of gender in
negotiation is fundamentally identitarian. It aims to bridge the difference
between men and women, MIF, and to disrupt gender hierarchy, M > F, by
specifically improving women's place at the bargaining table, carrying a brief
for F alone. This discourse is separatist and minoritizing in its recognition of
the "female/feminine" as a distinct and coherent group affiliation,
underscoring the ways that sex/gender difference produces the inequality
women experience that it deems necessary to base its brand of feminist
identity politics.'34 The byproduct of this strategy is that it allows for
traditional negotiation advice and models of reform that are definitionally
derived in identity alone. As described, either M or F only has a long way to
go-not both, and nothing in between.
My postmodern feminist critique tries to dissociate male bodies,
masculine traits and tendencies, and sex/gender hierarchy from one another,
rendering negotiation a domain in which traditionally sexed/gendered
134 See discussion infra note 201. My characterization of the traditional feminist
approaches to gender in negotiation as "separatist" and "minoritizing" apply concepts
introduced in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's work on the "double bind." The idea is that
progressive social movements are trapped between prevailing and conflicting
conceptions that define the current politics of our social and cultural organization.
Sedgwick argues that in respect of gender and sexuality, this incoherence operates on
different levels between "separatist" and "integrative" and between "minoritizing" and
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expressions are transitory."' It applies Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's vision of
human sexuality that, as Janet Halley put it much later, "takes a break" 136
from difference feminism and leads Sedgwick to advocate, controversially,
in favor of suspending gender as a viable category of analysis altogether.'37
Sedgwick does not understand gender as a biologically determined or
socially constructed difference, but rather as a dyadic and diacritical
distinction in which the meaning of "masculine" depends on it being other
than "feminine," in which the superordination of M depends on its being
other than the subordination of F, as concepts understood only in contingent
relation as designating the absence of characteristics implied by the other.138
135 It may be said that the organizing principle of queer theory is its anti-identitarian
impulse. See generally Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 14; SEDGWICK,
TENDENCIES, supra note 11, at 27; Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer:
Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman
Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830, 837 (1996) ("Many would argue that this
indeterminacy-this inability to ascertain a precise definition and framework for the term
queer-is precisely what gives it its power: queer is many things to many people,
irreducible, undefinable, enigmatic, winking at us as it flouts convention: the perfect
postmodern trope, a term for the times, the epitome of knowing ambiguity."). See
generally HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 112-114. (tracing the divergence
of queer theory from identitarian theories of gender and sexuality, both feminist and non,
including discussion of how they seek the welfare of different sexual subjects).
16 I borrow this phrase from HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11. It should be
apparent to those who read Halley's work that her suggestion we "take a break" from
feminism, as Halley argues Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and others did, does not mean to
reject feminism altogether. It means that we temporarily suspend feminism so that we
may explore aspects of gender and sexuality that may resound in other terms, rather than
"kill it, supersede it, abandon it; immure, immolate, or bury it." Id at 10.
17 To open up lines of anti-homophobic inquiry, Sedgwick argues that to suggest
heteronormative sexuality is embodied male dominance and female submission, M > F,
and therefore constitutive of actual or perceived gender difference, M/F, presupposes that
sexuality is in its base form heterosexuality. Therefore, Sedgwick writes "[it may be ...
that a damaging bias toward heterosocial or heterosexist assumptions inheres
unavoidably in the very concept of gender." SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET,
supra note 11, at 31. See also BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 22-23.
Sedgwick and Butler were responding here, in part, to difference feminist theories that
viewed sexuality as the linchpin of gender inequality. See MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State, supra note 87, at 516, 530-531.
.38 SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, supra note 11, at 31. See also
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 136. This builds off of Ferdinand de
Saussure's work in linguistics, and in particular his idea that meanings given to paired
opposite words are relational. See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN
GENERAL LINGUISTICS 127 (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans.,
1983); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS, 128 (Charles Bally
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This means the sex/gender difference perspective is incompatible with intra-
sex or intra-gender group experiences because the perspective's interface
with relations between a racialized man and trans woman at the bargaining
table, say, in the richness and diversity of their experiences, is less clear, may
be less relevant, and does not permit a more nuanced analysis of events
irreducible to the terms M/F."' One application of Sedgwick's theory is that
any mapping of characteristics along the diacritical frontier of sex/gender-
or as I have depicted it, the conventional opposition of male/masculine and
female/feminine principled negotiation behaviors in the above chart-is an
ideological trap. It gives the principle of sex/gender difference, M/F, and the
hierarchical organization of "men's ways" over "women's ways," M > F, "a
conceptual privilege of incalculable consequence" that it does not deserve.140
It also suggests the ontology of sex/gender difference in principled
negotiation is a structuralist invention and therefore must be susceptible to
deconstruction.
One means to do this is suggested by Judith Butler, who uses the
cultural practice of drag to trouble the concepts of "natural" or "necessary"
gender. Butler argues that drag kings and drag queens do more than imitate
female/feminine and male/masculine identities as their diacritical opposites,
but they reveal how all women and all men imitate the these identities as
well.' Gender is revealed to be an activity that is inscribed on individuals
by sustained repetitions that are performative in nature,142 such that neither
& Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., 1974); ROBERT SCHOLES, STRUCTURALISM
IN LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION (1974).
139 See SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, supra note 11, at 32.
140 Id at 31. See also MALCOLM EvANS, SIGNIFYING NOTHING: TRUTH'S TRUE
CONTENTS IN SHAKESPEARE'S TEXT 167 (1986): ("[A] feminism which operates outside
the post-structuralist critique of the subject and the sign runs the risk of inadvertently
reproducing the more fundamental aspects of the discourse nominally under attack, while
also disregarding modalities of the text that could be used to reinforce the theoretical
challenge."); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1169, 1209 n.208 (1998) (arguing that sex-based stereotypes contribute
to the hierarchical organization of male/masculine over female/feminine norms.)
141 See Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 21 (arguing that drag reveals
there to be no original or primary gender that is not "appropriated, theatricalized, worn,
and done"); Sarah E. Chinn, Gender Performativity, in LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 294, 300-01 (Sally R. Munt & Andy Medhurst eds., 1997) (A
drag queen states, "If you think my pretending to be a woman is hard, think what an
effort it must be for a woman to do.")
142 Butler centers her discussion of performativity on J. L. Austin's now standard
definition of "performative" speech, which are words that do what they say and therefore
enact change. Austin and Butler argue that performativity is never a singular action, but
requires repetition as a normalizing practice to convey the authoritative force of its own
40
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M nor F can attain the status of pure, pre-social, or pre-cultural gender
reality. Drag marks the dissolution of gender identity itself by displacing and
replacing its normative cultural configurations, M and F, such that even these
will generate their own constitutive resistances.43 Butler's theory echoes a
more dynamic conception of power suggested by Michel Foucault, that is
exercised not only along the vertical axis of male domination and female
subordination through juridical force (M > F, what Foucault calls
"puissance"), but also along a highly fragmented horizontal "field of force
relations" between discursive modes of behavior (what Foucault calls
"pouvoir") as if "transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a
society that shift about."i" This revision of power-as-pouvoir is diffused
through social and cultural institutions, through innumerable and replaceable
"microtechniques" to which the docile pre-gendered and re-gendered body is
subjected.145 Accordingly, Butler writes that gender is contingently
constituted through discursive effects in a process of signification: "gender is
the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly
rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of
substance, or a natural sort of being." 4 6 11 other words, men and women
write their genders onto their birth-sexes by enacting diacritical distinctions
at the bargaining table, and there may be no hierarchical organization with
respect to which congealed gender reality, M or F in principled negotiation
attempted doing. See generally J. L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O.
Urmson & Marina Sbish eds., 1975); Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech in
PERFORMATIVITY AND PERFORMANCE (Andrew Parker & Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick eds.,
1995).
143 See TERESA L. EBERT, LUDIC FEMINISM AND AFTER: POSTMODERNISM, DESIRE,
AND LABOR IN LATE CAPITALISM 216 (1996).
i" FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 11, at 96. Foucault rejected
the trite point that "power is everywhere" as a misreading of his work, stating instead that
"I scarcely use the word power, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for
the expression I generally use: relations of power." See Foucault, The Ethics of the
Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom (P. Aranov & D. McGrawth trans.), in
MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY, AND TRUTH (Paul Rabinow ed.), in 1 THE
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 1954-1984, 291 (Paul Rabinow ed. 1994)
[hereinafter Foucault, The Ethics of Concern for Self].
145 The "microtechniques" of political power, which I frame here as a gendering
power, can be compared to Foucault's "hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment" in the
French Revolution, oppressing and liberating at once. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135-194 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
i" BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 32-33. Butler articulates her theory
of the materiality of the body as an "effect" of power - or rather, as "power in its
formative and constituting effects" - more fully in her later work. See BUTLER, BODIES
THAT MATTER, supra note 11, at 2, 9, 34, 251.
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theory and practice, is the more false.'47 While Butler veers between
resistance and endorsement of the consequential feminist politics of her anti-
identitarian theory,1 8 as I do later in this article,149 the key point of her
critique is that M and F are unfixed and unstable "subjects" that describe
nothing essential about the body. She writes, "[w]hen the constructed status
of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes
a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that "man" and "masculine"
might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and "woman" and
"feminine" a male body as easily as a female one."so
Applying these ideas, if we disaggregate the elements that have
traditionally defined negotiators' identities from their sex/gender categories,
it appears that these elements broken down and listed in the same order as
the chart above would include the following:
* "your biological (e.g. chromosomal) sex, male or female";
* "your self-perceived gender assignment, male or female (once
supposed to be the same as your biological sex)";
147 See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE supra note 11, at 40; FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY, supra note 11, at 100-01. See also Cohen, An (Un) Useful Category, supra
note 10, at 190 ("Each time we perform ourselves through language in negotiations to
conform to (or challenge) compelled social expectations we (re)constitute our (gender)
identity. But because there is no core or psychic "I" underneath our performance, each
continuous repetition --although maintaining the illusion of a seamless self (e.g.,
"woman") -- places identity at risk by virtue of its social/temporal compulsion to
repeat.") But see JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE
BODY 59 (1991) (arguing that male domination may stem from "power relations at the
microlevel of society," as an implicit assumption of greater falseness attaches to the
female/feminine).
148 What I call Butler's "postmodern feminist" or "queer-feminist" work, as the
labels imply, demonstrates this equivocal quality. See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra
note 11, at 23 ("If sexuality is conceived as liberated from gender, then the sexuality that
is 'liberated' from feminism will be one which suspends the reference to masculine and
feminine, reinforcing the refusal to mark that difference, which is the conventional way
in which the masculine has achieved the status of the 'sex' which is one."); Butler,
Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 19 ("But politically, we might argue, isn't it
quite crucial to insist on lesbian and gay identities precisely because they are being
threatened with erasure and obliteration from homophobic quarters? Isn't the above
theory complicitous with those political forces that would obliterate the possibility of gay
and lesbian identity?").
149 See infra Section III.C, An Identity-Equivocal Politics.
50 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 6.
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* "the preponderance of your traits of personality and appearance,
masculine or feminine (once supposed to correspond to your sex
and gender)";"'
* your individual or group affiliation with any number of
demographic identifications, (once supposed to correspond to
your own identity);
* your expertise, connection, or other relation with the subject
matter of the negotiation (once supposed to correspond to your
own identity and contingently for men and women lines when
sex/gender is salient to the dispute);
* the biological sex of your negotiating counterpart;
* the gender assignment of your negotiating counterpart;
* the masculinity or femininity of your negotiating counterpart;
* your perception of your own and your counterpart's bargaining
capacities (once supposed to correspond to your own and your
counterpart's sex/gender);
* your orientation toward competitive situations, and the
frequency with which you engage in them (once supposed to be
positively oriented and more frequently engaging if
male/masculine, negatively oriented and less frequently
engaging if female/feminine);
* your tendency to "ask" during negotiations (once supposed to
ask for more and set higher targets if male/masculine, ask for
less and set lower targets if female/feminine);
* your level of risk aversion (once supposed to be less averse if
male/masculine, more averse if female/feminine);
.5. These first three bullets are lifted from Sedgwick's similar "exploding list" in
Tendencies, discussed below, that Sedgwick designed to disaggregate and therefore exert
pressure on the congealing elements of "sexual identity." See SEDGWICK, TENDENCIES,
supra note 11, at 6-8.
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* your willingness to settle (once supposed to be more willing if
male/masculine, less willing if female/feminine);
* your nonverbal communication tactics (once supposed to use
more dominant signs if male/masculine, less dominant signs if
female/feminine);
* the loudness and other aspects of your voice, as well as your
sensation and perception of your negotiating counterpart's voice
(once supposed to use louder voices and consider loud voices to
be less aggressive if male/masculine, softer voices and consider
loud voices to be more aggressive if female/feminine);
* your length and manner of speaking (once supposed to speak
longer if male/masculine, shorter if female/feminine);
* your tendency to interrupt or be interrupted (once supposed to
interrupt more frequently if male/masculine, be interrupted
more frequently if female/feminine);
* your tendency to project doubts or to project certainty during
negotiations (once supposed to downplay doubts if
male/masculine, downplay certainty if female/feminine);
* your tendency to exert control over subject matter (once
supposed to exert more control if male/masculine, less control if
female/feminine);
* your tendency to use threats or derogatory put-downs in
negotiations (once supposed to use more threats and put-downs
if male/masculine, less threats and less put-downs if
female/feminine);
* your recourse to abstract and objective or relational and
subjective markers in your dealings with other people (once
supposed to emphasize abstract and objective criteria if
male/masculine, relational and subjective needs if
female/feminine);
* your interest in winning or in maintaining a good relationship
with your negotiating counterpart (once supposed to be more
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concerned with winning if male/masculine, more concerned
about maintaining a good relationship if female/feminine);
* your comparative valuation of equity and equality in negotiated
outcomes (once supposed to value equitable distributions that
reflect pertinent power imbalances if male/masculine, equal
distributions even when possessing greater economic strength if
female/feminine);
* your allocation of resources between negotiating parties (once
supposed to divide in a self-serving way if male/masculine, in
an equal way if female/feminine);
* your win-win or win-lose orientation (once supposed to be win-
lose oriented if male/masculine, win-win oriented if
female/feminine);
* your general disposition toward negotiation and inclination to
negotiate (once supposed to be more positively disposed and
initiate more often if male/masculine, less positively disposed
and initiate less often if female/feminine);
* your inclination to negotiate for yourself (once supposed to be
more likely if male/masculine, less likely if female/feminine);
* your feelings of confidence and success (once supposed to feel
more confident and successful if male/masculine, less confident
and successful if female/feminine);
* your level of self-efficacy about negotiating ability (once
supposed to feel higher self-efficacy if male/masculine, lower
self-efficacy if female/feminine);
* "and-again-many more."l52
Sedgwick made use of a similar "exploding list" technique in her own work
to disaggregate the elements of "sexual identity" into its independent
152 Id. at 8. By leaving the list open to new and future additions, Sedgwick suggests
that the independent elements of sexual identity, like the independent elements of
negotiation identity, are unlimited.
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fragments."' Halley explains the operation of Sedgwick's exploding lists in
this way: "each of th[e] vertically disarticulated elements comes with a
parenthetical aside, the horizontal dimension, which reveals it to be less
ontological-less a new 'fact' about sexual identity that has to be added to
our understanding of reality-than ideological, a supposition, a funny idea
we have and could probably ditch." 5 4
I read the above list as exploding the binary structure of sex/gender
difference in principled negotiation, M/F, into an expandable series such that
for individual male and female negotiators, any one element traditionally
associated with M or F could switch to F or M or morph into something else
entirely without predetermining the gender outcome of any other element in
the series."ss It follows that if certain liberal and cultural feminist approaches
to negotiation are transfixed by the stereotypically "rational, competitive,
self-maximizing, hard-bargaining, masculine male negotiator" called M, and
the stereotypically "emotional, collaborative, relational, soft-bargaining,
feminine female negotiator" called F, as mystified figures constituted by
sexed/gendered elements, a postmodern feminist approach would make room
for these characteristic constellations but is equally if not more interested in
other prospective and shape-shifting modes of being. Consider, for example,
the "creative, emotional, thrill-seeking cisgender male, biracial account
manager with a relatively quiet voice, who is interested in fostering a long-
term business relationship." Or consider the "analytical, conventionally
attractive, profit-driven, transgender female, bisexual general counsel, born
in Japan and a two-time cancer survivor, who is prepared to litigate."
Disaggregating sex and gender means that the constituent elements of a
negotiator's identity cannot signify monolithically,'56 but will dynamically
interact with demographic factors including race, class, language, ethnicity,
sexuality, culture, relationships, power, status, professionalism, ethics, and
others, where even more dizzying, dazzling intersections are possible."' As
"1 Supra note 151 and accompanying text.
15 HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 204.
15 Id.
156 SEDGWICK, TENDENCIES, supra note 11, at 25.
"7 This principle reflects the imperative in feminist literature since the mid-1980s,
both inside the law and out, to complicate studies of gender and sexuality with
intersecting acts, identities, and oppressions. See generally Patricia Hill Collins, Black
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (2d ed.
2000); Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, and Class (1983); bell hooks, Feminist Theory:
From Margin to Center (2d ed. 2000); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 115 (1989); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
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Halley puts it, the elements "ramify in an unimaginably large number of
directions," and the "exploded list launches an open-ended trajectory ending
with implicit ellipses leading out to infinity." 158
If we accept that these affects pose a challenge to the sex/gender
framework, then we should question the theoretical premises of any attempts
at compromise that imply only one sexed or gendered space-any one new,
idealized domain-which male and female negotiators should mobilize
linearly into.159 Consider the alternatives. In liberal feminist theories of
negotiation, maleness/masculinity is endorsed at the expense of potentially
useful female/feminine expressions which are devalued. In cultural feminist
theories of negotiation, female/femininity is endorsed at the expense of
useful male/masculine expressions which are devalued. The postmodern
feminist perspective would be cautious about, if not reject outright, any
separatist and minoritizing impulse to isolate F identity and carry a brief for
it, either by encouraging her to assimilate "men's ways" of negotiating,
F4M, or by encouraging him to assimilate "women's ways" of negotiating,
M-F, in all cases. Neither of these models can accommodate the full
spectrum of bargaining behaviors as equally valued.
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien
Katherine Wing, ed., 1996); Evangelina Holvino, Complicating Gender: The
Simultaneity of Race, Gender, and Class in Organization Change(ing) (Center for
Gender in Organizations, Working Paper No. 12, 2001); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990);
Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J. LAW &
Soc'Y 351 (2000). This idea also borrows from innovative scholarship in cross-cultural
negotiation, which has emphasized that gender status beliefs need to be elaborated
beyond M and F to consider what happens when other characteristics become of interest.
See generally Karen L. Proudford, Notes on the Intra-Group Origins of Inter-Group
Conflict in Organizations: Black-White Relations as an Exemplar, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 615 (1998); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Sanda Cheldelin & Deborah Kolb, What
Travels: Teaching Gender in Cross-Cultural Negotiation Classrooms, 31 HAMLINE J.
PuB. L. & POL'Y 531 (2010). A number of other scholars have recognized the failure of
negotiation studies to address the intersectionality of sex and gender with other factors, if
without critiquing the identitarian focuses of these studies as explicitly as I have. See,
e.g., Folberg & Golann, supra note 12, at 187-188; Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute
Resolution, supra note 30, at 8; Cohen, Must We Ask?, supra note 124, at 30; Kolb, Too
Bad for the Women, supra note 8, at 516; Menkel-Meadow, Teaching About Gender and
Negotiation, supra note 18, at 363.
118 HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 267.
1" This idea is adapted from Judith Butler, who argued that any identitarian gesture
of "coming out" necessitates a new spatial zone to be "in" which imposes its own costs.
See Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 14-15.
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These ideas are partly inspired by David Lax and James Sebenius's
famous criticism that principled negotiation fails to address the so-called
"Negotiator's Dilemma." As Lax and Sebenius describe it, the Negotiator's
Dilemma is the fundamental tension that exists between prevailing and
conflicting impulses to compete and to collaborate when resolving
disputes.i'o Principled negotiation assumes these intuitions to be exclusive
and defining of individual identities, corresponding to unique traits and
tendencies that distinguish their respective ideological commitments. As
Peter Adler puts it, "each . .. has its own logic, its own bargaining pattern, its
own outlook and style, its own assumptions about human nature, its own
explanation of conflict, its own theoreticians, and its own zealots.""6 ' Lax
and Sebenius explain that a dilemma arises when an identified "competitive"
or "collaborative" negotiator must respond in situations where both strategic
imperatives become salient in a dispute at the same time.'62 They illustrate
the push-and-pull as follows:
Negotiators and analysts tend to fall into two groups that are
guided by warring conceptions of the bargaining process. In
the left-hand corner are the "value creators" and in the right-
hand corner are the "value claimers." Value creators tend to
believe that, above all, successful negotiators must be
inventive and cooperative enough to devise an agreement
that yields considerable gain to each party, relative to no-
agreement possibilities. Some speak about the need for
replacing the "win-lose" image of negotiation with "win-
win" negotiation, from which all parties presumably derive
great value ....
160 DAVID A. LAX & JAMEs K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 29-30, 34 (1986). For additional
treatment of the Negotiator's Dilemma as described by Lax and Sebenius, see generally
ROBERT MNOOKIN, ScoTT PEPPEr & ANDREW TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); Charles B. Craver, The
Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and Value Claiming During Bargaining
Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2010).
"' Adler's work has been excerpted or endorsed in a number of leading negotiation
texts. See Adler, supra note 15, reprinted in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 17-27
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman eds., 2006), and Frederick H. Zemans,
Representative Negotiators of Integrity, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
REPRESENTATIVE NEGOTIATION 105-106 (Colleen M. Hanycz, Trevor C. W. Farrow &
Frederick H. Zemans eds., 2008).
162 LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 160, at 29-30.
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Value claimers, on the other hand, tend to see this drive for
joint gain as naive and weak-minded. For them, negotiation
is hard, tough bargaining. The object of negotiation is to
convince the other guy that he wants what you have to offer
much more than you want what he has . . . To "win" at
negotiation-and thus make the other fellow "lose"-one
must start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of
concessions, minimize the benefits of the other's
concessions, conceal information, argue forcefully on behalf
of principles that imply favorable settlement, make
commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements,
and be willing to outwait the other fellow ....
Both of these images of negotiation are incomplete and
inadequate. Value creating and value claiming are linked
parts of negotiation. Both processes are present. No matter
how much creative problem solving enlarges the pie, it must
still be divided; value that has been created must be claimed.
And, if the pie is not enlarged, there will be less to divide;
there is more value to be claimed if one has helped to create
it first. An essential tension in negotiation exists between
cooperative moves to create value and competitive moves to
claim it.1 63
Here, Lax and Sebenius suggest it is a mistake to assume that equally
legitimate and conventionally opposite views-two reciprocal and
potentially "warring" modes of action-which are each "incomplete and
inadequate" at expressing the full range of psychic qualities available to men
and women on their own, properly belong to one group of negotiators and
not the other. While Lax and Sebenius only rescue the attributes "value
claiming" and "value creating" from ideological capture, I would argue that
163 Id. at 30-32, 38-40. There are many iterations of the Negotiator's Dilemma, but
the most common in the negotiation scholarship are between claiming versus creating
value (as Lax and Sebenius describe here), resilience versus flexibility in taking
positions, following a prepared strategy versus pursuing new options opportunistically,
being honest and forthright versus opaque and reticent, feeling trust versus distrust, and
acting nobly versus selfishly. Many more are possible. See ROY J. LEWICKI, BRUCE
BARRY, DAVID M. SAUNDERS & KEVIN TASA, ESSENTIALS OF NEGOTIATION 236-237
(Canadian ed., 2011). Other scholars have analogized the Negotiator's Dilemma to the
context of revealing interests versus concealing interests. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee
Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 8 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert
H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert B. Wilson, eds., 1995).
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we can just as easily rescue the other elements of a principled negotiator's
sex/gender identity in the exploded list, such that all are shown to have a
possible, if not necessary occurrence in most dispute resolution processes."
The Negotiator's Dilemma reflects the tension inherent in the traditional
feminist approaches which represent the constituent elements of "men's
ways" and "women's ways" as separate means and methods, while it is
strategically necessary that we recognize their associated characteristics are
alternately accessible to all of us.
This theory helps to discredit the popular suggestion that instead of "fix
the woman" or "fix the system around the woman," we should consider how
to design and enforce social, cultural, or legal systems that are built upon an
elusive, enlightened middle ground. This is an attempt to strike the "right"
balance between "men's ways" and "women's ways" along the horizontal
dimension of each entry in the exploded list, such that our model negotiator
is now an integrated, fully human, and symmetrically androgynous figure
coloured in by an ideal shade of grey between the diacritical black and white
("A"). We might call this feminist negotiation theme, "fix everyone around
the androgyne." This theme is reflected by prescriptions in the classroom
that "men should learn to be more like women and women should learn to be
more like men."'6 5 According to this theory, we should reject the MIF
dualism altogether, assume that men and women are equally mobile and
essentially the same, M=F, and aspire to a superior "third sex" model that
combines all or some of the psychic qualities traditionally associated with
male/masculine and female/feminine negotiators. In other words, this means
that because A>M and A>F, both men and women have a long way to go,
and we should carry a brief for everyone by effectuating M 4 A and F 4
A.1 66
" A related point concerns the tensions that exist between potentially incompatible
"conflict styles," such as those outlined in the widely used psychological test, the
Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument: competing, collaborating, compromising,
avoiding, and accommodating. See generally Melissa L. Nelken, The Myth of the
Gladiator and Law Students' Negotiation Styles, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1
(2005). My application of the Negotiator's Dilemma could apply to this or any other
relation between two or more prevailing and conflicting bargaining orientations that are
necessary to resolve disputes.
1" I have not found specific appeals to "androgyny" in the negotiation literature, but
I offer the term for its analogy to popular prescriptions in negotiation classrooms, as
described, as well as the term's extensive treatment by feminist theorists elsewhere.
'" The model of androgyny that I discuss (and reject) in this section refers to the
symmetrical assimilation of M and F rather than the asymmetrical alternation between M
and F. The symmetrical model may have ancient origins, but Virginia Woolf's classic
formulation of "spiritual cooperation," drawing on Samuel Taylor Coleridge's quest for
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This is not my position for three reasons. First, aspirations to "gender-
neutral" codes of conduct that purport to blend equal parts black and white in
an androgynous, "third sex" model are usually fictitious because they reflect
an androcentric bias. If we unpack the idea of gender deconstruction in a
manner that redefines traditional male/masculine negotiation behaviors as
"androgynous," M = A, the problematic liberal feminist imperatives, M > F
and F 4 M, remain but in the sameness feminist disguise, A > F and F -
A." Second, there is no one-size-fits-all negotiation best practice or strategy
for reform called A which should be recommended, will be applicable, or
may even be possible to express in every case, as interactional and
institutional circumstances will change between them. Invariably, there will
be situations in law and business where such a rigid, inflexible model of a
an organically whole, transcendent androgynous mind, may be the most compelling. See
VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN 128 (Oxford ed., 1998). The most influential
modem proponent of symmetrical assimilation was psychologist Sandra Lipsitz Bern,
who argued that the psychic combination of masculine and feminine qualities into the
third category of sex-role identification, "androgyny," was most conducive to success
and happiness. See generally Bem, supra note 127; Sandra Lipsitz Bern, Sex Role
Adaptability: One Consequence of Psychological Androgyny, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 634 (1975). There is extensive contemporary feminist scholarship spanning
several disciplines that explores the transformative potential of androgyny in both its
symmetrical and asymmetrical forms. See generally CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A
RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY (1973); Judith M. Bardwick, Androgyny and Humanistic
Goals or Goodbye, Cardboard People, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN: WHO WILL SHE BE?
61 (Mary Louise McBee & Kathryn A. Blake eds., 1974); Joyce Trebilcot, Two Forms of
Androgynism, reprinted in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 70-78 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin,
Frederick Ellison, & Jane English eds., 1977); Mary Ann Warren, Is Androgyny the
Answer to Sexual Stereotyping, in "FEMININITY," "MASCULINITY," AND "ANDROGYNY"
(Mary Vetterling-Braggin ed., 1982); James P. Sterba, Reconciling Conceptions of
Justice in MORALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: POINT/COUNTERPOINT 18-26 (James P.
Sterba, Alison M. Jaggar, Carol C. Gould, Robert C. Solomon, Tibor R. Machan,
William A. Galston, & Milton Fisk, eds.. 1995); Olsen, The Family and the Market,
supra note 93, at 1577-1578; Littleton, supra note 92, at 1291-93, 1302.
167 See e.g. notes 83-87 and accompanying text on the perils of "gender-neutrality."
Carrie Menkel-Meadow captures this idea most imaginatively: "The trouble with marble
cake is that it never has enough chocolate; the problem with androgyny is that it never
has enough 'womanness."' Littleton, supra note 92, at 1302 (citing Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Address at the 15th National Conference on Women). See also Catharine
Hantzis, Is Gender Justice a Completed Agenda? (Book Review), 100 HARv. L. REV.
690, 698 (1987) (reviewing ELINOR LENz & BARBARA MYERHOFF, THE FEMINIZATION OF
AMERICA: How WOMEN'S VALUES ARE CHANGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES (1985));
Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 32, 45 (1988) [hereinafter
Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference].
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negotiator's creative capacity will work against her client's interests,
however enlightened the model appears. Finally, arguments from a "third
sex" are an attempt to remedy one or more perceived deficiencies in the
conceptions M and F by reinstituting a new identity that is similarly
restrictive in its expressive potential. Rather than ellipses leading out to
infinity, they impress a new and imposing clarity in the singular form A
which permits no deviation. This ignores the postmodern feminist critique
that gender is not a stable property of the self, but something properly
understood as enacted by the practice of negotiation that is continuously
evolving, lending itself to alternating bargaining tactics colored in by other,
more occasional, kaleidoscopic shades than undifferentiated grey. Illusions
of androgyny miss the crucial point.
That is, traditional male/masculine and female/feminine negotiation
behaviors are mutually reiterative and no more authentic than drag. Their
being "identified" at all is the original mistake. No trait or tendency properly
belongs to one gender and so the endeavor should not be to "try on the other
gender" as if the tried-on trait or tendency is someone else's property,"' but
it conceives of effective bargaining as the constant and improvisatory
switching of abstracted activities, drawn from an infinitely expandable
database of subversive potentialities in social, cultural, and legal life. This
includes the capacity to shift between traditional male/masculine and
female/feminine behaviors during the same negotiation and between
different negotiations as needed, even if he or she may have a preceding, but
of course not "natural" or "necessary" disposition in favor of one practice or
the other. If men and women are recast as players in unbounded fields of
action, the bargaining table becomes a site where all sorts of gender-bending
expressions are possible. Postinodern feminist negotiation is to effectively
transcend liberal feminist and cultural feminist theories of gender difference
in which men and women are constitutively limited by bargaining "best
practices" and strategies for reform that are exclusively one-directional. If we
extend the metaphor again, no one party has only one way to go. This theory
is a network of streets that are turning and twisting and intersecting at many
intervals that are then demolished and repaved and turning and twisting again
in a wild, discombobulating journey. There are many ways to go, and the
thrill of the ride is in forgetting where you started.
168 Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 21.
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B. Protean Negotiation
There exists at least one model in the principled negotiation scholarship
that reflects a postmodern feminist sensibility. Adler suggests that when
faced with the paradoxes of acting competitively and collaboratively or
morally and pragmatically, an effective negotiator requires a conceptual
frame that is fluid, dynamic, and able to house a variety of bargaining
rituals.' He writes: "He or she can dance the competitor's jitterbug, the
collaborator's tango, the moralist's waltz, or the pragmatist's four step. One
dance may be more comfortable than others, and the dances can be
sequenced, but they are all in repertoire. The protean negotiator adapts.""'o
While not framed in explicitly feminist terms, I can appreciate Adler's use of
central metaphor, not the androgyne Hermaphroditus but the shapeshifter
Proteus, who conceives of himself as performing any number of traditionally
inconsistent, potentially confusing, and conceptually novel gender forms that
may attend different bargaining orientations. "Like Proteus," Adler explains,
"skilled negotiators . . . can undertake some kind of emotional and
intellectual diagnostic, recalibrate expectations, and reflexively adjust their
approach."171
Adler cites as inspiration the work of Robert Jay Lifton, a psychiatrist
and historian who synthesized his observations about the human condition
into what he called the "protean" style of self-process. Lifton treated mental
health patients struggling to reinvent themselves in the context of social,
cultural, and political upheavals, noting in his patients certain common
threads: restlessness; constant flux; the persistent feeling of disconnection,
dislocation, and displacement; intellectual and emotional rejection of
orthodoxy; a sense of many-sidedness.'72 His reflections are quite
16' Robert Benjamin, The Protean Sensibility: Reconsidering Approaches to
Leadership and Negotiation, Unpublished Paper, cited in Adler, supra note 15.
170 Adler, supra note 15. [emphasis added]. I owe a credit to my first negotiation
teacher, Fred Zemans, for introducing me to Adler's work during my studies at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
171 Id. See also Nelken, supra note 164, at 7 ("A skillful negotiator, then, always has
to consider the subject matter of the negotiation, the situation of the parties, and the styles
of the other negotiators in deciding what negotiation style is the most likely to further her
client's goals in a particular instance. Flexibility is the key to success in a variety of
negotiations.").
172 ROBERT JAY LIFroN, BOuNDARIEs: PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN IN REVOLUTION 37-44
(1' ed. 1970) ("[One patient] asked the question, "Is there, or should there be, one face
which should be authentic?" He wasn't really sure ... He went on to compare himself to
an actor on the stage who, as he put it, "performs with a certain kind of polymorphous
versatility," ... And he went on to ask, "Which is the real person, so far as an actor is
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remarkable, describing one patient's condition in terms that anticipate the
poststructuralist deconstruction of the selfl73 and Butler's deconstruction of
gender and sexuality as exemplified by drag,174 as a series of actor's masks
that expose the performativity of social and cultural roles. Lifton goes on to
describe his patients' self-process as a sort-of repeated rejuvenation, as a
crossing and re-crossing of newly outmoded moral, ethical, and intellectual
boundaries that increases their possibilities by enhancing "tactical
leverage.""' The process figures as both the means for survival and strategy
for success in a rapidly evolving, increasingly globalized, and highly
fragmented world:
Yet there is reason for believing that the present antipathy to
total ideology is something more, that it is an expression of a
powerful and highly appropriate contemporary style .... It
is an effort to remain open, while in rebellion, to the
concerned? Is he more real when performing on the stage, or when he is at home? I tend
to think that for people who have these many, many masks, there is no home. It is a futile
gesture for the actor to try and find his real face?"). Lifton founded his theory in three
global historical developments after World War II: the world-wide sense of psycho-
historical dislocation or disconnect between men and women and the symbols of their
cultural traditions; the flooding of imagery produced by the flow of postmodern cultural
influences over mass communication networks; and the kinds of physical and existential
threat to the self that is associated with the breakdown of traditional boundaries of
destruction in warfare. Id. at 44.
173 Compare LIFroN, supra note 172, at 38 ("If we understand the self to be the
person's symbol of his own organism, then, self-process refers to the continuous psychic
recreation of that symbol.") with Butler, Imitation and Gender, supra note 11, at 18 ("For
if the 'I' is a site of repetition, that is, if the 'I' only achieves the semblance of identity
through a certain repetition of itself, then the I [sic] is always displaced by the very
repetition that sustains it. ... And if the 'I' is the effect of a certain repetition, one which
produces the semblance of a continuity or coherence, then there is no 'I' that precedes the
gender that it is said to perform; the repetition, and the failure to repeat, produce a string
of performances that constitute and contest the coherence of that '.'). Lifton emphasizes
that his critique extends to all areas of human experience in advanced industrial society,
"to the political as well as to sexual behavior, to the holding and promulgating of ideas,
and to the general organization of lives." Id at 45.
174 LIFrON, supra note 172, at 45, 55 ("Everything he touches he mocks. 'Thingness'
is pressed to the point of caricature. He is indeed artistically reborn as he moves freely
among the physical and symbolic materials of his environment, but mockery is his birth
certificate and his passport. This kind of duality of approach is formalized in the stated
'duplicity' of Camp, a poorly defined aesthetic in which (among other things) all
varieties of mockery converge under the guiding influence of the homosexual's
subversion of a heterosexual world.").
1 7
1 d at 101.
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extraordinarily rich, confusing, liberating, and threatening
array of contemporary historical possibilities-and to retain,
in the process, a continuing capacity for shape-shifting.17 6
Lifton's prophecy of an adapting, "shape-shifting," protean style later
emerges in terms that presage Halley's understanding of the exploded list,
which style he imagines as "an interminable series of experiments and
explorations, some shallow, some profound, each of which can readily be
abandoned in favor of still new psychological quests.""' Built on such a
foundation, protean negotiators are poised to succeed precisely because there
is anti-identitarian complexity and chaos. As Lifton might describe, male and
female negotiators should conceive of themselves as performance artists
borrowing freely, impressionistically, and distortingly from their
contemporaries as a means of finding their own way,178 rebelling from fixed
and total forms of ideology, MIF, to form a bargaining strategy that greatly
enhances their tactical leverage.
More fundamentally, the protean negotiator model calls for a new
referential system for relating men and women to themselves and to their
counterparts at the bargaining table. Or, as Frances Olsen sought explicitly, it
seeks a radical "departure from the ordinary image of males and females as
correlatives" that permits alternative ways of theorizing negotiators'
affective and productive lives.179 In this new system, men and women should
be encouraged to imitate shades on the full color spectrum that are equally
valued and should be made accessible to every negotiator as interactional and
institutional circumstances allow in our society for more than black and
white and grey but, as Olsen famously said, for "reds and greens and
blues"'80 and-again-many more.18 ' This locates an altogether different
176 Id at 98-99.
177 Id at 44 [emphasis added]. For further exploration of the concept of a "protean"
self, see generally DAVID L. MILLER, THE NEW POLYTHEISM: REBIRTH OF THE GODS AND
GODDESSES (1974); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE PROTEAN SELF: HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN
AGE OF FRAGMENTATION (1993); JAMES OGILVY, MANY DIMENSIONAL MAN:
DECENTRALIZING SELF, SOCIETY, AND THE SACRED (1997); John A. Powell, The Multiple
Self- Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1481, 1504 (1997).
"" LIFroN, supra note 172, at 103.
"9 Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 93, at 1578. Olsen's vision may be
the most well-known and controversial account of asymmetrical androgyny in the legal
literature.
180 Id.
181 I am not the first to explore this kind of "gender-freed" ideal of social, cultural, or
legal activity. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 166, at 178-179 (arguing that the ideal of
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figure than M or F, the shape-shifting gender-bender, at the base of its
constitutive theory that derives an additional means of political resistance
through the practice of principled negotiation.
C. An Identity-Equivocal Politics
The postmodern feminist critique does not lend itself to easy solutions.
Critics of my work may argue that sex- and gender-hierarchical effects can
and probably will occur where protean negotiation is practiced or taught, at
least for a time. Protean negotiation may not be an immediately effective or
complete strategy for correcting unfairness or inequality because men and
women are not able to enact politically subversive expressions with the same
costs and benefits.'8 2 Taking this further, some critics may argue that my
theory propagates an assimilationist discourse in the nalve or disingenuous
chorus of "universal access" because male/masculine standards of
negotiation behavior will remain intact if we fail to redeem the subordinated
category of female/feminine before purporting to suspend, reject, or
transcend sex/gender difference altogether.' Certainly, it is well-
asymmetrical androgyny is appropriate "with respect to feminine and masculine traits
which are largely matters of personal style and preference and which have no little direct
moral significance."); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 91, at 72 ("Feminism
must envision a post-patriarchal world, for without such a vision we have little direction.
... That vision is not necessarily androgynous; surely in a utopian world the presence of
differences between people will be cause only for celebration. In a utopian world, all
forms of life will be recognized, respected, and honored. A perfect legal system will
protect against harms sustained by all forms of life, will recognize life affirming values
generated by all forms of being."); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 171 (1989) ("A just future would be one without gender. ... In its social
structures and practices, one's sex would have no more relevance than ... the length of
one's toes."); JAMES P. STERBA, JUSTICE FOR HERE AND NOW 80 (1998) ("[T]he traits that
are truly desirable in society [must] be equally open to both women and men or, in the
case of virtues, equally expected of both women and men.").
182 The differential impacts on male and female gender-benders have been well-
documented in a variety of social, cultural, and legal contexts. Supra note 47 and
accompanying text regarding the professional woman's "double bind." Elsewhere,
scholars have observed that courts in sex discrimination cases may be more sympathetic
to women expressing non-femininity than men expressing non-masculinity. See generally
Render, supra note 87, at 117-18.
183 Many feminists have expressed concern that theoretical work done under the
banner of "postmodern" or "queer" may seek to "trouble" the idea of gender difference
but, in doing so, merely ignores or dismisses the real difference that gender makes. See,
e.g., Walters, supra note 135, at 845; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points against
Postmodernism, 75 CtH.-KENT. L. REv. 687 (2000). Christine Littleton succinctly
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documented that as a practical matter, there may be specific dangers to
women for trying to assimilate or to undermine male and masculine forms in
law and business." It is also well-documented that many feminists have
made brave and historic invocations of female/feminine identity under the
representational regime M/F in the past, which have been powerfully
transgressive in the dispute resolution context and elsewhere.' Following
the critics' argument through, it would seem the real progressive politics of
principled negotiation are manifested in the cultural feminist approach to
gender, most likely, "fixing the system around the woman" as part of a
strategic essentialist effort,186 perhaps, to challenge the appeal of universalist
humanism that threatens to erase the category "female/feminine" of its
subversive potential.
These critics have a point. Even if I believe the postmodern feminist
critique is more convincingly termed than this, all feminists should remain
alive to "the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and
resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning"'18 that are revealed as any
deployments of power, including my recourse to alternative theories, are
deconstructed.'18  I continue to struggle with my own concerns about
captures the objection that I am anticipating here: "[The social devaluation of "woman"]
can be disrupted either by revaluing what women have been perceived to be, or by
reassigning the attributes that comprise the social sexes, or both.. However, I am making
a claim for one form of disruption rather than the other, based on my analysis of male
power as a system. ... So long as equality analysis takes place in a system defined by the
club, reassignment of social sex attributes must itself operate unequally." Littleton, supra
note 92, at 1333-34.
'" Supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
185 Supra note 112 and accompanying text on cultural feminist deployments in ADR.
See also, generally, Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lawyering: A
Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1071 (1992). (assessing the feminization of
the legal profession in light of women's ethic of care); Cohen, An (Un)Useful Category,
supra note 10, at 170 (outlining the influence of difference feminists on the development
of feminist legal education, consensual dispute resolution, and the "feminization of
negotiation.").
1"6 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing
Historiography in IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 197 (1987); Leti
Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense", 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 54 (1994) at n. 162.
187 For Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, the term "queer" referred to "the open mesh of
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning
when the constituent elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or
can't be made) to signify monolithically." SEDGWICK, TENDENCIES, supra note 11, at 25.
1" Here and throughout, I am trying to resist the temptation to prescribe postmodern
feminist theory, or any theory for that matter, as universal and totalizing. See HALLEY,
SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 11, at 273.
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assimilationist discourse. But these critics may also overstate their case in
response to a threat that the protean mindset will lead to political
"paralysis."'8 9 Specifically, they might ask me how feminists can improve
the lot of women if the social construction that organizes our efforts, the
historically disadvantaged female/feminine negotiator, F, has been
disidentified by critique.'90
A postmodern feminist thinker might frame the issue differently. Is it
possible to comprehend, let alone organize around, the social constructions
M and F, and to equalize the hierarchical relation M > F, without reinforcing
sex-and gender-based stereotypes about negotiating behavior? Or could these
identities and their associated behaviors be the product of those stereotypes?
What if women, at once impressed by the imperative to identify with an
unchanging image of their sex or gender assignment, influenced by male and
masculine norms in the law and business boys' club, and pressured by
members of their profession who themselves had internalized stereotypes,
begin to conceive of themselves in a limited way? What if celebrating the
female or feminine as necessary constructions and fixing the system around
their kinder, gentler referents are not unequivocally good things?'9 ' Is
1' See HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS supra note 11, at 187 ("But how can we seriously
entertain Butler's deconstruction of woman? For does it not deny the social existence of
women, disable us from organizing on behalf of women, and lead to paralysis?").
1" The implications of feminist/queer/postmodern/poststructuralist approaches to
this existential question have filled many volumes. See generally Eichner, supra note 11,
and HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS supra note 11, at 106-273 (genealogizing the literature of
feminism and postmodernism through the 1980s and 1990s). The critical threat of
dissolving the category of "woman" has also been put directly. See generally Jacques
Derrida, SPURS 49 (Barbara Harlow trans., 1978); Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism
Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 406 (1988).
The strategic ramifications on women's political organization have also been explored at
length. See Biddy Martin, Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault, 27 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 3, 16-17 (1982); Misha Kavka, Introduction in BRONFEN & KAYKA, supra note
11, at ix-x; Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe
Frug, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1096, 1104 (1992); Seyla Benhabib, Feminism and
Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance in BENHABIB ET AL., supra note 11, at 20. See also,
generally, JUDITH BUTLER & JOAN W. SCOTT, FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL
(1992).
"' Judith Butler suggests that attempts to revalue upward the M/F binary risk
adopting "the very models of domination by which we were oppressed, not realizing that
one way that domination works is through the regulation and production of subjects." See
Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations, in BENHABIB ET AL., supra note 11, at 48. Wendy
Brown raises a specific concern, that female or feminine identities galvanized in this way
may "become [so] deeply invested in [their] own impotence" on account of real or
perceived trauma, that feminists should seek deconstruction rather than revaluation. See
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reifying gender difference over and separate from other qualities always
preferable to the creation of new social and cultural artifacts, theoretically
accessible to all? What if the practice of protean negotiation could be
similarly transgressive as some cultural feminist models?
At least in my view, anti-identitarian theories and identity-equivocal
politics are not necessarily complicitous with sex and gender inequality.
Exploring these potentialities, Foucault writes that discourse "can be both an
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a
point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy."'9 2 This
characterizes Foucault's political projects that are drawn on a constantly
shifting landscape that knows no single privileged place of power, M, whose
removal will bring an unjust or unequal system tumbling down.'9 3 My hunch
is that negotiations are determined periodically, but not permanently, by
downward exercises of power-as-puissance, M over F, which means that
stereotypically male/masculine traits and tendencies enacted as pouvoir will
not necessarily leverage sex/gender hierarchy in all cases. This implies that
principled negotiation standards are not inherently male/masculine but
merely associated with men, that transgressive political activity may take a
gendered feminine or masculine form, and that such activity may be enacted
by women or men. By so defining our terms, protean negotiation is
conceived as a postmodem feminist project that seeks to improve the welfare
of a class of negotiating subjects that includes some cultural feminists'
feminine woman, but reaches beyond to include the gender-bending
masculine woman, the gender-bending feminine man, and-yes-even the
masculine man, to the extent that no one's conduct is intrinsically oppressive
WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 70-74
(1995).
192 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 11, at 102 (emphasis added).
Foucault describes the means of resistance to "relations of power" as appropriately
mobile: in a "strategic situation," in "tactics," and in "practices of freedom." See
Foucault, The Ethics of the Concern for the Self, supra note 144, at 282-284.
193 in one of his most visionary moments, Foucault believed that a postmodem future
would transcend traditional gender and sexual boundaries. See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY, supra note 11, at 5 (predicting "nothing less than a transgression of laws,
a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality,
and a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power will be required."). See also
Susan Stanford Friedman, Beyond White and Other: Relationality and Narratives of Race
in Feminist Discourse, 21 SIGNS 1, 7 (1995) (calling the self a "script of relational
positionality," defined as "[a] feminist analysis of identity as it is constituted at the
crossroads of different systems of stratification ... acknowledging how privilege and
oppression are often not absolute categories but, rather, shift in relation to different axes
of power and powerlessness.")
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or bankrupt, everyone has the capacity to shape-shift, and everyone is
limited, albeit in different ways, by sex-and gender-based stereotypes about
their bargaining behavior.19 4
I would argue that through the discursive impacts of protean negotiation,
gender-benders pose a challenge to traditional sex/gender conceptions that
define and limit men and women at the bargaining table. Butler argues that
drag performances are not necessarily subversive, but they may be depending
on interactional and institutional receptions in which constitutive confusions
can be fostered."' Wherever possible, she writes, "drag fully subverts the
distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both
the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity."'9 6
The same can be said about protean negotiation. Michael Warner explains
that "if queers, incessantly told to alter their 'behavior,' can be understood as
protesting not just the normal behavior of the social but the idea of normal
behavior, they will bring skepticism to the methodologies founded on that
idea."l97 It follows that if protean negotiators, incessantly told to alter their
behavior, can be understood as protesting the very idea of "normal"
sexed/gendered bargaining behaviors by conceiving themselves as outside
the binary M/F, they will bring skepticism to the methodologies founded on
that idea.
This is a potentially radical move. The more that traditional gender
identities, M/F, are expropriated by protean negotiators who engage in
gender-bending acts, the more that the notion of "men's ways" of negotiation
being superior to "women's ways," M > F, is shown to be artificial. And the
more that this script is disrupted by experience on the ground, the more that
it should motivate other people to engage in gender-bending acts at the
expense of the traditional models which have historically disadvantaged
women and gender-bending men in the law and business professions.198 This
194 This point has been made elsewhere, but without engaging the anti-identitarian
critique of postmodern feminism and queer theory in a detailed way. See Menkel-
Meadow, Teaching about Gender, supra note 18, at 361 ("The deconstruction of false
gender labels is often just as empowering to men (who want to be collaborative and
information sharing in negotiation without the stigma of being a negotiation 'sissy') as it
is to women who are strong interest-maximizing competitors.").
195 BUTLER, BODIEs THAT MATTER, supra note 11, at 125.
1 BuTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 174.
197 WARNER, supra note 11, at xxvii.
19 This is inspired by a twofold motivation. The first is Joan Scott's critique that
politics deriving their authority in claims to "experience" largely ignore the ways that
Foucault's conception of discursive power-as-pouvoir may inform and are informed by
this experience itself. See generally Joan W. Scott, Experiences, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE
THE POLITICAL 22-40 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992). The second is Sharon
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should help us to reveal that sexual and gender hierarchy is a political
invention rather than a "natural" or "necessary" fact, vitiating an ideological
basis on which imbalances of bargaining power currently rest."' And if the
hierarchy that underlies the subordination of women and gender-bending
men is consistently challenged in this way, that organization may no longer
be used to define sex/gender stereotypes about male/masculine and
female/feminine behavior. If this assessment is correct, my postmodern
feminist critique need not imply the paralysis of feminist identity politics.
They may rest on different theoretical foundations, but to the extent they are
united in political resistance to sex and gender inequality, I believe they are
adjacent but allied, directed toward similar ends.
IV. CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATING RESISTANCE
My intent in writing is to start a conversation, to ask new and potentially
redemptive questions about the progressive politics of gender in principled
negotiation theory and practice. It is meant as a critique only, as a proposal
that feminists question something and not that we replace one progressive
politics with something else. This is borne of my intuition that even if
cultural feminist and postmodern feminist negotiators share some unity of
purpose, certain fundamental issues will remain in tension between them.
Above all, parts of cultural feminism and postmodern feminism reflect firm,
ideological commitments to competing discourses of "identity" and
"activity" respectively, which found divergent methodologies for correcting
the gender gap in bargaining behavior. On the one hand, women should
assert their distinctive traits and tendencies as female/feminine, emphasize
differences separating them from the rest of society, and seek to revalue
these differences upwards on account of "real" women's unique gender
identity. On the other hand, women should avoid identifications with the
female/feminine that many experience as inaccurate or demeaning,
emphasize similarities integrating them in the rest of society, and celebrate
Marcus's work on women's disruption and "explosion" of rape scripts that neither create
nor result from immutable identities of the male oppressor and female oppressed. Sharon
Marcus, Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in
FEMENISTs THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 392 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
199 This reasoning bears similarity to Catharine MacKinnon's argument that
prohibitions on same-sex marriage constitute sex discrimination because the threat of
same-sex sexuality in societies characterized by substantive inequality undermines sex-
and gender-based stereotypes about men and women. See, e.g., MACKI4NON, SEX
EQUALITY, supra note 87, at 1067-68.
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the unpredictable potential of all men and women to engage in protean
acts.200
These theories give rise to a "radical and irreducible incoherence"201
within feminist negotiation-what I call, the Feminist Negotiator's
Dilemma-and there may be no way to resolve it. While many reformers
advocate for the pre-eminence of either discourse and routinely rely on
strategic arguments founded in one or the other, they are in an intractable and
dynamic impasse that cannot be pulled apart if we are to fully understand the
role of gender in principled negotiation theory and practice. Lax and
Sebenius make a similar point. It may be a mistake to assume two legitimate
and historically opposing feminist views are not both strategically necessary
when each view is incomplete and inadequate at resisting an unequal system
on its own. We may need to upend the system with both arms.
Looking ahead, this should lead us to ask an important question. If both
cultural feminists and postmodern feminists promote substantive quality as
a normative ideal, and if both agree that unfairness and inequality in
bargaining processes and outcomes are informed by legal and professional
standards that historically favor "men's ways" over "women's ways" of
negotiating, what might progressive feminist interventions in the negotiation
field look like?
I would reject the simplicity of focal negotiator theories that see gender
as an individual characteristic generated inside and determined by the
200 I offer four excellent discussions of the corresponding dilemma between cultural
feminist and postmodem feminist approaches to gender difference that reach across
disciplines, including proposals for a new feminist politics that, if not bridging their gaps,
affirms and celebrates their ontological contradiction. See generally Alcoff, supra note
190; Eichner, supra note 11; Scott, Deconstructing Equality- Versus-Diference, supra
note 167; Gruber, supra note 91.
201 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues that modem gay and lesbian movements are
trapped in a "radical and irreducible incoherence" between prevailing and conflicting
conceptions that define the current politics of our social and cultural organization. To
illustrate on the level of homosexual definition, Sedgwick explains that a discourse is
gay-separatist if it is minoritizing, meaning that it elevates gays and lesbians as an
identifiable minority, underscoring differences separating them from the rest of society.
Gay-separatist, minoritizing arguments generally track that there is a distinct population
of persons who "really are" gay or lesbian on account of their unequivocal, immutable
sexual identity or status. Contrasting with this, Sedgwick explains that a discourse is gay-
integrative if it is universalizing, meaning that it regards gays and lesbians as part of the
universal whole, underscoring similarities integrating them in the rest of society. Gay-
integrative, universalizing arguments generally track that fixed sexual identities should
be dissolved on account of the unpredictable and shared potential of all persons to
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negotiating subject only. I would avoid totalizing grand narratives and
universal pronouncements about men, women, the masculine, and the
feminine, and their identified traits and tendencies at the bargaining table. I
would question the application of principled negotiation "best practices" and
other professional credo that rely on uniform descriptions, general rules, and
androcentric assumptions that narrow and normalize the expressive potential
of male and female negotiators.
Instead, I would focus a more contextual approach to concrete issues in
dispute resolution, tailoring negotiation practice and prescription to the
specifics of a problem in ways that take account of relevant interactional and
institutional circumstances. In all cases, I would ask and analyze how a
negotiator's group affiliations, intersectional identities, and diverse social,
cultural, and professional conditions may play a part in determining
bargaining behavior and outcomes. I would remain open to initiatives that
revalue upward so-called "female/feminine" negotiation traits and tendencies
as part of a strategy to reform gender hierarchical legal structures, but do so
without advocating for the use of "female/feminine" tactics at all times,
without essentializing or moralizing about women's experience, and perhaps
without associating these tactics with women or femininity at all. I would
embrace the use of a more directed negotiation pedagogy that encourages
students to decipher their experiences with legal and business cultures
through a gender lens, applying feminist theory in strategic political
deployments, in critical self-reflection, in deconstruction of gender
stereotypes, in sustained evaluation of professional and ethical standards, and
in pleas for greater fairness and equality in bargaining processes and
outcomes between women and men everywhere.
These interventions attempt to marry my activism and skepticism, to
inspire a "protean feminist" politics of gender in negotiation that may have
greater transgressive potential than cultural feminist or postmodern feminist
negotiation alone. But they are only an attempt. There may be no easy
convergence that is both effective in practice and pedagogy, at least at all
times, and capable of resolving this dilemma in theory. I think we may be
left to negotiate its resistances. Feminist negotiation is not as stable or as
static as previously thought. This may be precisely what gives it its power.202
202 For my framing of the Feminist Negotiator's Dilemma, I owe a credit to Richard
Ford's treatment of an analogous "double bind" in the racial politics of difference. See
Richard Ford, Beyond "Diference ": A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 57,75 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
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